Bard College

Bard Digital Commons
Masters of Science in Economic Theory and Policy

Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

2017

Grants: Band-Aids on a Bullet Wound
Heske van Doornen

Recommended Citation
van Doornen, Heske, "Grants: Band-Aids on a Bullet Wound" (2017). Masters of Science in Economic Theory and Policy. 14.
http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/levy_ms/14

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College at Bard Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters of Science in Economic Theory and
Policy by an authorized administrator of Bard Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact digitalcommons@bard.edu.

Grants: Band-Aids on a Bullet Wound

Thesis Submitted to
Levy Economics Institute
of Bard College

by
Heske van Doornen

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
December 2017

Acknowledgements: Sincere thanks go out to the faculty and staff at the Levy Economics
Institute, for cultivating a beacon of hope in the midst of a dismal science. Particular thanks go
out to Randall Wray, for offering thoroughly helpful guidance and advice throughout the process
of writing my thesis. I also want to thank my classmates for their moral support at every stage.
Lastly, I am beyond grateful for my parents’ unconditional love, and for my husband, who gave
me the courage to pursue this path.

PLAGIARISM STATEMENT

I have written this project using in my own words and ideas, except otherwise indicated. I have
subsequently attributed each word, idea, figure and table which is not my own to their respective
authors. I am aware that paraphrasing is plagiarism unless the source is duly acknowledged. I
understand that the incorporation of material from other works without acknowledgment will be
treated as plagiarism. I have read and understand the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
statement on plagiarism and academic honesty as well as the relevant pages in the Student
Handbook.
Name: Heske van Doornen
Date: December 14, 2017
Signature:

1

ABSTRACT
Kenneth Boulding maintains that the economy is comprised not just of an exchange system (twoway transfers), but also of a grants system (one-way transfers), where the latter arises to bridge
gaps in the former. This paper uses Boulding’s unconventional framework to analyze the modern
economy of the United States. I investigate grants issued by the government, by families, and by
private entities, and reveal their respective inabilities to adequately mitigate inequality and
unemployment in the exchange economy. I show that the current grants system is unable to
bridge the gaps in exchange, and that the grants expansion that would be necessary to accomplish
this is ill-advised. I conclude that rather than using a basic income guarantee to expand grants,
the US should strengthen its exchange system with a job guarantee. While this would not
eradicate gaps in exchange completely, it would reduce them to a scope that grants can safely
bridge.

KEY WORDS: Grants; Exchange; Unemployment; Inequality; Welfare; Government; Family;
Parental Assistance; Charity; Philanthropy; Job Guarantee; Basic Income Guarantee
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: B31; H80; D13
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 323) argues that “the outstanding faults of the economic
society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment, and its arbitrary and
inequitable distribution of wealth and income.” This statement is as valid today as it was in 1936.
Although the official unemployment rate has fallen in recent years (to 4.6 percent in November
2016), we are far from achieving an economy in which all who are willing and able to work
indeed have a job. Dantas and Wray (2017) show that part of the decline in the official
unemployment rate is because people without jobs are giving up the search. Those who give up
searching are not considered part of the labor force, and therefore not considered unemployed,
bringing the official unemployment rate down. At the same time, people who want but cannot
find full-time unemployment are counted as employed, helping to reduce official rates even
more. Taking both these groups into account, the authors provide an “Augmented
Unemployment Rate” which reached 12 percent in 2016; more than 7 percentage points higher
than the official estimate. They reveal that 20 million US workers are at least partially idled
despite wanting to work (more).
Unemployment is not unrelated to inequality; unsurprisingly, not having a job makes it
easier to fall into poverty, and end up at the bottom of the distribution. But even having a job (or
two) does not always offer a way out. Many US citizens are forced to work at wages below
subsistence level, or barely above it. In 2015, the average household income was $34,074 for the
bottom 90 percent of the US population, compared to $312,536 for the top 10 percent, $477,293
for the top 5 percent, $1,363,977 for the top 1 percent, and last but not least: $6,747,439 for the
top 0.1 percent (Saez 2009). These vast disparities have grown over the course of the past
century. While the majority of US workers find themselves with stagnating incomes, those at the
top of the distribution snap up the gains of every economic expansion (Tcherneva 2017).
As such, unemployment and inequality continue to be “outstanding faults of the
economic society,” in Keynes’s words. Undoubtedly, there are many factors at play that
perpetuate their presence, including trade liberalization, technological advancement, political
shifts, privatization, union decline, global competition, etc. All have had their influence. But I
suspect there is another cause; a more fundamental and nevertheless elusive one, that has helped
the perpetuation of these “faults” in our society. And that is how economists view the economic
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system; what we understand the economy to be, and not to be, and where we look when it comes
to fixing it.
Traditionally, economics has focused on exchanges. If you add up all the exchanges that
take place, you have the “economy.” But a more suitable definition of an economy may be the
system by which we provide and distribute resources such that our society can at least subsist,
and hopefully improve. With that definition, exchange is not the only thing worth paying
attention to. Rather than concerning ourselves with exchange to the exclusion of all else, we
should expand our scope to consider everything within our system of provisioning, which
includes the production of resources and their distribution. Doing so allows for new topics to be
taken up in our study, and old topics to be re-classified and their role re-examined. This could
allow us to construct a more wholesome economic framework.
Such an expansion of the scope of economics can reveal movements in the economy that
would otherwise go unnoticed, help us recognize new patterns, and point us to new solutions.
Therefore, this paper revives Kenneth Boulding’s Theory of Grant Economics, and applies its
framework to the US economy in the past century. Boulding’s framework of the economy
distinguishes between the exchange system (comprised of all two-way transfers) and the grants
system (comprised of all one-way transfers), where the latter arises to bridge gaps in the former.
I focus on the distribution element of provisioning, by asking to what degree grants are able to
mitigate exchange gaps like unemployment and inequality, and if we should use policy to
increase or decrease our use of grants. Given the current efforts in economics to reinvent the
discipline and shake off some of its unrealistic methods of analysis, this is a useful exercise.
Outline of This Thesis
This thesis starts by providing an overview of Boulding’s theory of Grants Economics, which
offers a framework for economic analysis in which not only two-way transfers (exchanges) but
also one-way transfers (grants) are included. I discuss Boulding’s distinction between grants and
exchanges (as well as the sub-classifications of grants) and show how grants and exchanges
supplement each other in the overall economy to allow for the subsistence of society. I also
discuss the past applications of Boulding’s work, address some of the critiques that his theory
received, and refine his definitions.
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Next, I discuss the role that government has played in the exchange system and the grant
system during the past century. I show how the New Deal contributed directly to the exchange
system by serving as an employer of last resort, and simultaneously kicked off federal efforts to
provide grants through the implementation of the Social Security Act. In subsequent decades,
however, direct contribution to exchange was scaled back, while grants were expanded. This lead
to more and more people relying on grants, which eventually gave grants a bad reputation.
Reagan and Clinton then responded with efforts to scale back government grants by making
them more temporary and conditional. The number of grants recipients then dropped, but the
gaps in exchange remained. As the data on unemployment and inequality show, much of those
gaps remain present today. Our current government grant structure is not insignificant, but it is
unable to bridge the exchange gaps at hand.
Some of the exchange gaps that government grants fail to cover are accounted for by
grants issued within the family. Chapter IV discusses such grants in detail. I focus on grants
given by parents to their young adult children, whose decision or need to rely on family grants
for increasing periods of time provides insight into the way in which family grants step in to
bridge the gaps in the exchange economy. I also explore the different levels of access to family
grants, and comment on the potential distributional effects of young adults’ increasing reliance
on them. I conclude that family grants do not provide an appropriate solution to the gaps in
exchange for two main reasons. First, their unequal distribution can exacerbate wealth inequality
and thus worsen one of exchange’s biggest problems. Second, because they treat the symptoms,
not the cause, of the gaps in the exchange economy that young adults face.
If there are holes in the exchange economy, government grants are insufficient, and
family grants not available, some may turn to private entities for help. Chapter V addresses the
impact of private grants issued by individuals and institutions. It shows that their ability to bridge
the gaps of the exchange system are minimal at best. Private grants, while perhaps of use to the
subsistence of churches, higher education, and industry development, do little to address the
unmet needs of those who are underserved by the exchange system. Relying on charity and
philanthropy to attenuate the gaps in the exchange system would be unwise. Their focus is
elsewhere.
Based on the findings presented in the previous chapters, Chapter VI discusses two policy
approaches that could help bridge the gaps of the exchange system in a better way. The first
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option is to expand and equalize access to grants using a basic income guarantee, which involves
the unconditional supply of a monthly subsistence level grant to everyone, irrespective of labor
market status, race, or gender. If successful, this would equalize basic access to grants, and make
participation in the exchange economy optional. The gaps in the exchange economy however,
would remain.
The second option is to enhance government’s direct contribution to the exchange
economy, by providing a federal job guarantee. This would allow anyone who is willing and able
to work, but unable to find (subsistence level) employment in the private sector to find
employment with the government, at a living wage, with no extra education needed. Unlike the
basic income guarantee, which simply attempts to stretch government grants far enough to cover
the gaps in exchange, a Job guarantee would act to reduce those gaps. Doing so would not bridge
all gaps in exchange, but it would reduce them to sizes that grants can manageably handle.

II. BOULDING’S GRANTS ECONOMICS
English-born economist Kenneth Boulding (1910—1993) contributed to a wide variety of
academic disciplines. He concerned himself not just with economics, but also with education,
peace, philosophy, mysticism, and poetry. He intended to synthesize the social sciences into a
general system of analysis, which he deemed a more appropriate framework. So, it should come
as no surprise that Boulding considered the traditional scope of economics to be too narrow, and
advocated for a wider area of study (Sharpe 2015).
Specifically, Boulding (1981) points out that much of the economic discipline has a
disproportional focus on exchanges, i.e. two-way transfers. An exchange, as Boulding (1981, 2)
understands it, is a “rearrangement of assets of equal values among owners which leaves the networth of both parties unchanged.” Consider, for example, that person A gives person B ten
dollars, and person B gives person A a T-shirt in exchange. If the t-shirt is worth ten dollars,
there is no change to the net-worth of person A nor person B. (Whether every two-way transfer
indeed represent an equal exchange as Boulding suggests is more than questionable. I address
this in my refinements of Boulding’s definitions later in this chapter.) Much of economics
considers this type of exchange to be the dominant mechanism for resource allocation.
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Boulding (1971, 2) however, suggests that we shift our focus and “concentrate on the
exchangeables rather than on the act of exchange.” Doing so reveals that two-way transfers are
not the only mechanism by which economic goods are distributed. There are also one-way
transfers! If a child attends university, parents often pay the bills. If an earthquake destroys a
city, many people make donations towards a fund for reconstruction. But neither the parents, nor
the money donors, expect to receive anything specific in return. They engage in a transaction
without aiming to maintain the same level of net-worth; it is not an exchange. Boulding (1971)
calls these one-way transfers grants. Add them all up, and you get the grants economy. Together,
the grants economy and the exchange economy form our economic system.1 So, if we are to
provide an accurate description of how resources are allocated, Boulding reasons, we must
consider them both.
In 1981, Boulding asserted that grants account for 20—50 percent of the US economy: a
significant share. Within the grants economy, however, we can distinguish between different
types of grant. I classify them based on the area in which they manifest, making a distinction
between grants issued by the government, by private entities, and within the family. Boulding
also distinguishes grants based on their motivating force, and separates the Macro Theory of
Grants from the Micro Theory of Grants.
Government Grants
Government transfers to households can be understood as government grants, whether they
manifest as unemployment insurance, tax credit, food stamps, or something else. The quantity in
which the government may extend grants depends in part on the perception of need. Perceived
need, in turn, arises out of what Boulding (1981, 17) calls the “terms of trade strain.” This refers
to people’s dissatisfaction with any given system of prices and wages. If workers, for example,
realize that their terms of trade are worsening because their wages are reducing in purchasing
power, this creates a strain. If pressure rises, the grants economy can respond with an expansion
in the form of welfare payments, such as food stamps. This way, government grants fill gaps in
the exchange economy.

1

Of course, production for one’s own use (e.g. subsistence farming) forms a third category. But given this category
is rather small in the US, we will consider it out of the scope of this thesis.

10

Government grants feature in Boulding’s Macro Theory of Grants, which deals with the
impact of grants on the economy as a whole, in the form of employment, distribution, inflation,
etc. Decomposing the national product into consumption, investment, and government spending
reveals different components of the macro economy, each of which are influenced by grants
(Boulding 1973). As such, government grants interact with the exchange economy in two ways.
Firstly, they arise to fill gaps in the exchange economy, thus expanding and contracting in
response to it. Secondly, they give direction to the exchange economy, incentivizing investors,
and boosting or reducing consumption and associated profit expectations. This paper focuses on
the former.
Of course, Boulding is not introducing government spending and subsidies to the
economic discipline for the first time; rather, he is relabeling them. But it is important to
recognize that by distinguishing some government expenditures as grants, Boulding is reframing
them in a valuable way, which creates new possibilities for analysis.
Family Grants
Another large part of the grants economy arises within the family. Parents provide their children
with economic goods like housing, food, clothing, and personal care, without asking anything
specific in return. This way, parents extend grants to their children for many years. Only when
the children are old enough to subsist in the exchange system do parents stop providing grants.
Naturally, the sizes of the grants vary from family to family, with the associated distributional
consequences.
Parents’ decisions on whether to provide certain grants to their children can be analyzed
through Boulding’s Micro Theory of Grants. In this theory, Boulding (1981) argues that parents
support their children largely because they identify with them, and because there is a need. He
explains this with the help of interdependent utility functions. As parents identify with the
welfare of their children, their children’s utility affects their own utility. As such, parents support
their children without asking for economic goods in return. This system is reinforced by law, of
course, as children are not permitted to take part in exchange, and parents are legally obliged to
provide for them while they are young.
Naturally, some readers may object that family assistance should fall under grants.
Particularly in lesser developed nations, children are supported by their parents with the
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expectation that they will return the favor at a later age. In this case, Boulding (1981) too admits,
the transaction may best be described as a deferred exchange. In our analysis of the US,
however, this is not the case. Today, American children are not normally expected to provide a
large part of the care for their elderly parents; the support they receive is mostly a one-way
exchange.
This thesis, however, explores family grants in the context of parental assistance to young
adult children. Unlike during childhood, during which parents are legally obliged to provide for
their children, this period is a time in which parental aid is sometimes provided, and sometime
not, depending on means and preferences.
Private Sector Grants
A third place in which grants manifest is the private sector, with funding efforts such as
philanthropy, charity, and scholarship. Here, too, the Micro Theory of Grants can offer insight
into the operation. Boulding (1981) asserts that the choice to extend a private grant relies in part
on the grant’s efficiency: the efficiency of a grant benefit that the grantor perceives his grant to
provide the grantee. Only if that perceived benefit is bigger than the cost to the grantor will the
grantor choose to provide the grant. This mechanism is easily observable. Foundations and
philanthropists never hand out money without questioning how it will be used and doing due
diligence on the recipient of the grant. Only if they are convinced that the grantee has the
potential to put the money to good use will they make funds available.
A second factor that determines private granting is the degree to which the grantor can
sympathize with a grantee (Boulding 1962). In this case, the decision-making process around
offering a grant is not dissimilar from the decision-making process that occurs within the family.
Just like parents, grantors may feel compelled to provide a grant if they identify with the
wellbeing of their grantee. Consequently, grantors often make their funds available to individuals
that share specific characteristics with them. In the US, college award ceremonies make this
abundantly clear. Awards can be awkwardly specific, as the Latin American alumna that studied
creative writing in 1964 now wishes to provide a prize specifically for a female Latin American
sophomore who is majoring in creative writing, too.
Just like family grants, private sector grants operate as a supplement to the exchange
economy. I use Chapter V to further explore the degree to which private grants help bridge the
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gaps that are created by the exchange system and left partially unaddressed by government.

Grants of Love and Grants of Threat
Boulding (1981) argues that grants can arise from a force of love, or from a force of threat.
Grants of love are issued when the parties involved sympathize with one another. The family is
the most obvious place for love-based grants. Parents provide for their children because they care
about them. They know that children would not survive by the two-way exchange mechanisms
of the exchange system, and thus utilize one-way exchanges in the form of clothing, shelter,
food, education, etc. As mentioned earlier, this is worthwhile for the parents, because they
identify with their children and their wellbeing; the children’s utility influences the parents’
utility.
Grants of threat, however, occur when one person threatens another into the transaction; a
bandit screaming “your money or your life” is an example. When you hand over your wallet—
give him a grant—you do so because you fear that he will otherwise hurt you. While this may
look like an exchange—your wallet for your life—it is important to recognize that refraining
from doing harm is not the same as doing good. As such, a robbery remains a one-way
transaction, and a grant of threat. Within the category of grants of threat, we can consider
legitimate and illegitimate threats. The bandit that demands your money is illegitimate, because
it cannot be justified. Government taxation, however, is legitimate if it can be justified by the
need to gather funds for the provision of public goods. Since many of us would stop paying taxes
if there were no punishment for doing so, tax payment can be considered grants of threat. But
many of us also see the benefit of the threat, and would be in favor of keeping that threat in
place, given that it serves the greater good. We see the threat behind tax payments as justified, or
indeed legitimate (Boulding 1981).

Where Are We Going?
The shares taken up by the grants economy and the exchange economy vary between nation
states and over time, and change in response to different forces. Gaps in the exchange economy
may result in an increase of the grants economy, and vice versa. A shift in philosophy may come
to value exchange over grants, and initiate a focus on the former at the expense of the latter.
Changes in the economy affect the shares of grants and exchange, but also the other way around.
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Similarly, the share of love-based grants and threat-based grants will vary, too. We may find our
system concentrating in one or the other. In 1981, Boulding speculated about what might lay
ahead for the United States.
Are we, for instance, moving toward a society in which grants will make an
increasing part of the whole body of transactions, until exchange is reduced to
something quite vestigial; or are we likely to find this period of increasing grants
coming to an end and reaching some sort of equilibrium, and if so, at what level?
Are we moving toward a society in which grants will make up an increasing part
of the whole? Or are we moving toward a freer society, in which most of what is
necessary is done out of spontaneous goodwill? Do we look forward to increasing
equality, or do we contemplate a world of increasing inequality and exploitation?
(Boulding 1981, 103)

To illustrate the changing shares of exchange, love-grants, and threat-grants in an economy,
Boulding provides the below figure, in which the red dot represents the economy’s composition
at a given point in time (Figure 1). If the red dot were situated at the left bottom corner of the
triangle, that would reflect an economy based solely on exchange, with no grants at all. If the red
dot were in the top corner, that would describe an economy that operates purely on the
mechanism of threat-based grants. Lastly, the bottom right corner of the triangle represents the
“integrative system” in which love-based grants are the only mechanism of distribution. It is
impossible, Boulding argues, for any economy to rely exclusively on any one of the three
mechanisms. One may dominate, however, and introduce associated characteristics into the
economy.
A system dominated by exchange, for example, encourages a division of labor, and a
quest for productivity. Boulding claims that the more productive you are, the more you benefit
from exchange. A system dominated by love-based grants, on the other hand, would yield an
“integrative” system in which utility functions converge and parties help one another out of
mutual sympathy (Boulding 1963). A system dominated by threat-based grants would do the
opposite, and yield a state of war among its participants. An abundance of threats may lead to
submissive behavior, or an attempt to defy, perhaps even deter with the use of a counter threat.
The latter could give rise to a deterrence until one of the two parties credibility fails.
In 1981, Boulding understood the American economy to occupy the position represented
in Figure 1, but expressed uncertainty about the future trajectory of the red dot. Where in the
triangle we should understand the US economy to be today now remains a question.
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Figure 1: Triangle Diagram of Grants and Exchange

Source: Boulding (1981)

Grants Economics Applied
When Boulding first laid out his thoughts, “they nearly created a riot—Hicks turned pale, Harry
Johnson stopped whittling and Kuznets jumped up and down” (Harcourt 1983, 153). Over time,
however, he gained a few loyal followers that tried to apply grants economics to their analysis—
Martin Pfaff may have been the most prevalent one. In Grants and Exchange, Pfaff (1976, 31)
stresses that the value of Boulding’s contribution lies in its interdisciplinary nature. Any inquiry
into the “antecedents and consequences of grants,” he reasons, touches on a variety of
disciplines. “It becomes evident,” he proceeds, “that economic processes cannot fully be
explained by themselves.”
In much of his work, however, Pfaff fails to practice what he preaches. He extends and
formalizes Boulding’s grant theory, intending to reorient the evaluation of government policy.
But the interdisciplinary approach that he admires is hard to find in his application. Pfaff’s work
15

facilitates a connection between Boulding’s ideas and the economic mainstream, demonstrating
its role with traditional concepts like indifference curves, the Edgeworth box, and utility
functions. He makes comparisons between market systems and centrally planned economies, and
considers the problem of an optimal point for government grants. But all the while, he remains
within the traditional boundaries of neoclassical economics. While this may have reduced the
scope of Boulding’s work to a more manageable size and contributed to its message becoming
“almost respectable” as Harcourt (1976) phrases it, it also seems to have sacrificed some of its
imaginative qualities, and helped turn it into “radical economics by regular economists”
(Boulding 1981).
Wray (1994) suggests most of Boulding’s followers fell into this pattern, placing
Boulding’s ideas within the neoclassical framework, and failing to produce interesting insights.
Many employed the grants framework to assess the impact of government expenditure, often
concluding that public spending results in a misallocation of scarce resources, which falls in line
with the dominant free market ideology. Consequently, “very little of grants economics has been
radical” at all (Wray 1993, 1213). The work done on grant theory’s relevance in the financial
system Wray argues, may best exemplify this point. Redistribution Through the Financial
System is a collection of articles, by authors who “understand neither grant theory nor the
financial topics at hand” (Wray 1993, 1214).
In spite—or perhaps because of—the contribution of these followers, grants economics
did not take off, and Boulding (1981) came to refer to himself as a “voice crying in the
wilderness.” Heilbroner (1975, 77) speculates grant theory failed because Boulding was “not
interested in power, just in having fun,” but also points out that grants economics did not lend
itself well to “researchable hypotheses.” The thought system that Boulding contributed was
powerful, but it remained difficult to know “what to do with the insights,” concludes.
Wray (1994) argues that grants economics may have gotten more traction if it
incorporated more institutional principles. Boulding often begins from the assumption of
scarcity, asserting that transactions are characterized by a zero-sum game: the more I give you,
the less remains for me. This need not be the case. Most of the time, “resources are created,
rather than scarce,” which means that the improvement of person A’s net worth need not reduce
person B’s. While Boulding appears to have understood this logic in principle, he did not include
it in his framework of grants economics, which may have compromised its applicability (Wray
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1994).
Another part of the theory’s failure may be attributed to Boulding’s fuzzy definition of a
grant (Wray 1994). Boulding admits that it is not always easy to tell grants and exchanges apart,
but assures his readers that “we should not really worry too much about exact definitions, as long
as we recognize the place of each phenomenon in its own spectrum.” The spectrum can be
likened to the rainbow. It is okay not to be able to tell “where yellow leaves off and green
begins” so long as we can agree they are two different colors (Boulding 1981). Though a nice
metaphor, this explanation may not have gone down so well with those trying to turn economics
into a hard science.
As such, it seems that Boulding’s imaginative framework was unable to stand on its own
feet, and thus only came to be applied within the bounds of traditional theory. Failing to do
justice to its imaginative scope, this application seems to have been detrimental. If Boulding had
indeed been more interested in power, perhaps he would have introduced more rigor into his
ideas, so others could apply it without relying on the neoclassical framework for support. But
perhaps it was also a matter of the zeitgeist. If Boulding were to have surfaced today, his ideas
may have been awarded with a warmer welcome.
Today, many scholars recognize that the dominant economic models are out of touch
with the most pressing economic problems. Many have called for a rethinking of the discipline,
and expressed a need for a new vision of our economic system. I have little doubt that
Boulding’s framework is helpful in this context. That is why this thesis seeks to revive and build
on his insights in grants economics. To avoid the pitfalls of Boulding’s previous followers,
however, I do start by establishing a clearer distinction between green and yellow.

Refining Definitions
Upon examining the theory of grants economics, the muddled distinctions between grants and
exchanges raises questions. If I give you a grant today with the expectation that you give me a
grant tomorrow, and you share that expectation, do we still speak of grants? Pfaff (1971) asserts
these ambiguities as a non-issue, and notes that many economics transactions contain both grant
and exchange elements. But considering the failure of grants economics discussed above, I offer
my own refinements to the definitions before we proceed.
I suggest that we speak of exchange only when the resources transferred from one to

17

another and vice versa are clearly specified, i.e. not vague or left up to interpretation. I disagree
with Boulding’s statement that exchanges are transfers of “equal values” and leave both parties’
net worth unchanged. As such, I consider an exchange to be an exchange because both directions
of the transfer are explicitly specified, not because they are equal.
When no such explicit specifications are made, we can speak of grants. By this definition,
both government transfers and family support fall into the grants category, even though citizens
may contribute taxes in varying amounts, and children may want to help their parents later in
life. Because in both cases, no explicit terms of exchange are established, they are grants. The
government does not promise your full claims to benefits will add up to the same amount that
you contribute in taxes. Similarly, your parents will not itemize the costs you incurred and expect
you to support them in the same exact quantity. Private foundations operate in much the same
way. After receiving a scholarship of some kind, some degree of loyalty or favoritism to the
grantor may be expected, but such treatment is rarely specified.
As such, grants allow for a certain vagueness between the parties. Even if reciprocal
behavior is expected, the transactions are not expected to even out exactly, because no exact
terms were specified. So, while grants may result in reciprocity, no exact balance is expected or
enforced. This definition is not out of line with Boulding’s reasoning. His response to the
reciprocity question is that a reciprocal grant remains a grant because neither party can be forced
to return the favor. This flexibility, he explains, is not available in exchange, where parties must
do their part if the exchange is to occur. In accounting terms, Wray’s (1994, 1216) suggestion for
a definition fits this theory. He proposes to speak of a grant when we see “an increase of the
assets of one balance sheet without an increase of liabilities of that balance sheet.” This allows
for flexibility on the side of the grantee; favors can be returned, or not, because no liability is
specified.
Another point of critique worth addressing is the common view that grants economics
merely relabels the existing concepts in economics. I do not deny this is part of Boulding’s
procedure, but I urge readers to understand the gravity of names and frames before they label
such an activity as trivial. A reading of Boulding’s (1961) The Image could further their
understanding of this point. The short work stresses that our image of the world influences our
individual and social behavior, which in turn influences the world, which feeds back into our
image. The images we have of the mechanisms within our economy have an influence over the
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way we understand them, value them, and adjust them, or fail to do so. Making changes to those
images is not a trivial business, especially today, while the economic discipline finds itself at a
turning point. Seeing old concepts in a new light may be a crucial step in the way of developing a
less dismal science.

III. PUBLIC GRANTS & EXCHANGE CONTRIBUTION
Prior to the Great Depression, the federal government was not involved in securing economic
resources for its citizens or meddling too much with the exchange system itself. Any granting
that was done was left to local and county governments, which kept the scope small. It was not
until Keynes’s publication of the General Theory, and Roosevelt’s introduction of the New Deal
that this was irreversibly altered. Keynes (1936, 28) showed that the exchange system would not
create sufficient numbers of jobs on its own; the only way that would happen would be either by
“accident or by design,” he explained. This helped the Federal government to take a more active
stance in the economy, and to consider it its duty to ensure greater economic security for its
citizens. Ever since, government grants have played a big role in the political debate.
This chapter reviews our experience with and discussion around government’s direct
contribution to the exchange system during the New Deal, as well as its provision of three kinds
of government grants since then. The first are grants that alleviate the suffering of those who
cannot work, due to old age or disability. The second are grants that assist those who do work,
but fail to earn enough. The third are grants that help those who could work, but find themselves
without a job. While almost everyone agrees that the first type of grant is a necessity, opinions
have long been divided on the latter two.
We see that Roosevelt introduced federal-level grants alongside a direct boost to the
exchange system. While his grants covered those who were unable to work, public works
programs secured jobs for millions who would otherwise have been left looking. This way, he
stitched up the biggest gashes in exchange with public works, and stuck grant band-aids on what
remained. By the 1960s, however, direct contribution to exchange had been scaled back, and
grants saw an expansion. More and more able-bodied people, too, came to rely increasingly on
grants. This, in part, brought Reagan into power, who blamed grants for corrupting American
citizens, and initiated big cuts. Pointing to decreasing numbers of grant recipients, he claimed to
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be allowing the exchange system to mend its own holes. But large holes in exchange persist even
today. Of course, the current grant structure bridges parts of the gaps. But in absence of a public
works program, the gaps remain too large for grants to cover them all.

Roosevelt: The Introduction of Grants Alongside a Boost to Exchange
Following the Great Depression, it was clear that the exchange economy had dangerous gaps,
and needed government assistance. In England, J.M. Keynes advocated for governments to spend
during downturns, which would raise aggregate demand, and stimulate a recovery. In the US,
President Roosevelt introduced the New Deal; a set of government programs featuring not just
regulations on the banking industry and adjustments to the monetary system, but also a large
scale public works program that contributed to the exchange system directly, and the
introduction of government grants as provided at the federal level. Packaged as the Social
Security Act (SSA), Roosevelt implemented:
•

Social insurance, to which citizens contribute during their working
life, and could benefit from upon retirement. This falls into the first
category of grants, provided to those who cannot work due to old age.

•

Public assistance provided directly to those unable to work, i.e. the
disabled, and diseased. This, too, falls into the second category of
grants, provided to those who cannot work due to factors out of their
control.

•

Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), which aided children in families
with an absent or incapable parent. Single female-headed households—
often unemployed—were the largest recipient demographic in this
category (Caputo 2011).

•

Unemployment insurance, which provided assistance during
temporary periods of being unemployed. This falls into the third
category of grants, which assist those who can and want to work, but
find themselves without a job.
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In Boulding’s framework, all of Roosevelt’s grants can be classified as grants of love, introduced
with the intention to reduce the suffering of those in the community. 2 Roosevelt’s New Deal,
however, was comprised of more than just grants. He also boosted the exchange system by
creating jobs directly. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) employed millions of US
citizens to carry out a wide range of public works projects. The National Youth Administration
(NYA) served a similar purpose for anyone between the ages of 16 and 25, while the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) focused on young, unmarried men. Many of those who lost their jobs
during the recession joined one of these programs to secure an income in the exchange economy.
As such, Roosevelt’s introduction of grants came alongside a direct government effort in the
exchange economy.
In later years, Roosevelt kept expanding the government’s responsibility in providing
economic security for its citizens. In 1944, he utilized his State of the Union Address to
announce his Second Bill of Rights, in which he put forth that “individual freedom cannot exist
without economic security and independence.” Specifically, all people ought to have:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops
or farms or mines of the nation
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return
which will give him and his family a decent living
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by
monopolies at home or abroad
The right of every family to a decent home
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve
and enjoy good health
The right to adequate production from the economic fears of old
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment
The right to a good education

2

Today, roughly 60 percent of the government’s spending towards it is allocated to citizens that contributed Social
Security taxes for 40 quarters, where the amount those citizens receive is based on the income they earned during
those forty quarters, and adjusted to the cost of living. Another 40 percent is paid out to spouses and disabled
individuals who did not complete those forty quarters. While the payments clearly constitute a grant for the latter
group, the former does contribute. As such, part of this transaction looks like an exchange. But nevertheless, a grant
element remains even for this group, as almost everyone receives more than they contribute. As such, Social
Security can be considered a grant, even if it contains an exchange portion for many (Social Security Administration
2017).
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Roosevelt died before he could dedicate himself fully to the pursuit of the Second Bill of Rights,
but his message had been made clear. The exchange economy cannot be expected to provide jobs
for all, and it is the government’s duty to ensure that citizen’s right to economic security will still
be met, through direct contributions to the exchange system and the provision of complementary
grants.
Even as conditions improved, Roosevelt’s message lived on. John Kenneth Galbraith’s
Affluent Society (1958), for example, echoes some of the ideas that Roosevelt introduced.
Galbraith calls attention to case poverty (which results from poor education or health) and insular
poverty (which is caused by changes to the labor market and can affect entire demographics at
once), thus demonstrating that the fault lies with the system, not the individual. Given that the
capitalist system has both favorable, and unfavorable tendencies, those who find themselves in a
period characterized by the latter ought to receive the government’s support, Galbraith’s (1958)
argument implies.

Kennedy-Johnson: A Lost War on Poverty
In the 1960s, the Great Depression was well in the past, and any Roosevelt-style public work
programs had come to a stop. Persisting poverty then became a focal point for Kennedy; he
attributed it to a mismatch of skills, and wished for something to be done. The Johnson
administration realized this wish by declaring War on Poverty (WOP) and submitting the
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) to congress in 1964. Johnson maintained that the EOA dealt
with the causes rather than the symptoms of poverty (Caputo 2011). The WOP’s focus was on
education and job-training programs that would help the unemployed gain the skillset that was
thought necessary to function in the exchange economy. This put the focus on helping
households become what the exchange economy wanted them to be, while leaving the exchange
economy unchanged (Wray and Bell 2004).
At the same time, however, the Johnson administration boosted the grants economy.
Firstly, by creating permanent structures for the food stamp programs that Kennedy had launched
earlier, and secondly, by expanding the SSA to include health care. Medicare and Medicaid were
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initiated in 1965.3 Medicare would supply grants to cover medical care for the elderly and the
disabled, while Medicaid did the same for the poor. This expanded the grants system to cover an
area which had long been challenging for the exchange economy.
Although Medicare and Medicaid are still alive and can be considered a success, the War
on Poverty is widely regarded to have failed. Advocates of the WOP point out that the poverty
headcount was reduced to a third in the first decade, but Wray and Bell (2004) demonstrate that
reduction took place among the elderly, while the War on Poverty was focused on people of
working age. For them, poverty rates did not decline and the number of people relying on grants
went up. As time went on, more people—especially women with young children—became
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). While the program had roughly
three million monthly recipients by 1960, that number surpassed 10 million by 1971. Many
concluded that poverty had won the war, because the WOP failed to help struggling citizens get
back into the exchange economy. Rather, it seemed to have increased the number of people
relying on grants, despite the administration’s focus on job-readiness (Caputo 2011). Being jobready, it turns out, is not very helpful when there are no jobs.
This created a difficult environment for President Nixon, who took office in 1969. He
suggested an even greater expansion of grants under a guaranteed-income scheme titled the
Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The FAP would provide need-based assistance to families, paid
in cash, to be spent at the recipient’s discretion. When offered suitable work or training,
however, FAP recipients had to accept; the FAP was not an excuse to live idly. Rather, Nixon
emphasized “it increases the incentive to work.” Nevertheless, Nixon’s effort received criticism
from both the left and the right. After Nixon’s resignation, however, President Ford did
implement a grant extension by the name of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1975. This
made families with children eligible for a 10 percent tax credit on the first $4,000 of their
earnings. The EITC was expanded significantly over the years, with the federal cost rising from
$5 billion in 1979 to 25 billion in 1995 (Liebman 1998).
President Carter, however, took a different approach, by focusing less on securing grants
and more on securing exchange. His promise was to create a “job-oriented program for those

3

Medicare extends the same package of basic coverage to all citizens at the at the age of 65. This portion is a grant.
The optional extensions to the basic package, however, are structured like insurance packages, and should be treated
as such; they do not constitute a grant (Medicare 2017).
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able to work and a simplified, uniform equitable cash assistance program for those in need who
are unable to work by virtue of disability, age, or family circumstance” (Caputo 2011). This led
to the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1975,
under President Nixon. Based on Roosevelt’s WPA, CETA was a public works program that
provided low income and long-term unemployed people with federally funded jobs. During the
first year, CETA provided 227,000 transition jobs, and 157,000 more permanent positions in
emergency work (Schwartz 1984). Nine years later, however, the program was replaced by the
Job Training Partnership Act, shifting the focus back on to job training.
As such, the postwar period with Kennedy and Johnson, involved a scaling back of direct
exchange contribution such as Roosevelt had initiated. The period saw an expansion of grant
structures, in combination with a push toward job readiness training. For those unable to work
due to disease or old age, the grant expansion was a success. For those unable to find jobs despite
wanting one, job training in the absence of improvements to the exchange system itself was of
little help. For them, the gaps in exchange had again reached a size that grants should not have
been relied upon to bridge. The result was a widespread belief that the grants themselves—not
the exchange issues they were unable to cover up—were the problem. Carter and Nixon did,
however, provide a counterforce to the grants expansion by introducing CETA, which
contributed directly to exchange by offering federally funded jobs to the economically
disadvantaged. But the program was not allowed to last.
Reagan and Clinton: Ending Grants as We Know Them
Reagan gained a following by stressing that grants created a moral hazard by rewarding low
effort. If Roosevelt’s AFDC was to be retained, work requirements had to be much more
rigorous, he maintained. With public assistance to single mothers outweighing the potential
contribution of a father’s income, families are being ruptured, Reagan claimed. Grants, in
Reagan’s eyes, represent not just undeserved resources, but corrupting mechanisms that destroy
families at their very core (Caputo 2011). Exchange, on the other hand, restores responsibility,
accountability, and dignity. In 1988, Reagan solidified his rhetoric in the Family Support Act
(FSA). The most important aspect of the FSA were the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) programs, which all states were required to implement. Participation in JOBS programs
became mandatory for many mothers who previously received assistance through ADFC. The
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approach assumed that given adequate training, recipients of welfare (grants) could re-enter the
workforce (rely on exchange). Critics of the JOBS program, however, argued that states’
spending requirement on the JOBS programs were too low, resulting in poor quality services that
failed to help families. Moreover, those mothers who now did enter the labor force earned subpar
wages, causing at best a minimal increase to living standards. Under George H.W. Bush, the
reaction against grants continued. Referring to welfare as a “subtle destroyer” of one’s spirit, he
reinforced the idea that it was “never meant to be a lifestyle.” But it was also during the Bush
administration that the pitfalls of Reagan’s FSA became more obvious; participation in the JOBS
programs was low, and many of the initiatives did not function as planned (Caputo 2011).
Clinton followed, promising to “end welfare as we know it,” and echoing much of
Reagan’s sentiment that “people on welfare ought to go to work.” In 1994, he installed the Work
and Responsibility Act (WRA) to “help people move from dependence to independence” by
installing a two year time limit on cash assistance, although mothers of young children were
given extensions if they worked part time. Congress, however, had more rigorous plans, which
they successfully pushed through in 1996. Their Contract with America focused on welfare
reduction, tax cuts, and balancing the budget, which shifted the discussion. The first consequence
was that AFDC was scaled back to exclude the youngest mothers, and cut off recipients’
assistance after five years. The second consequence was the approval of Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which ended families’ entitlement to
federal cash assistance. This was indeed the end of welfare as it had been known, although in a
different form than Clinton had intended.
Under PRWORA, the AFDC as well as the JOBS program were replaced by Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Whereas AFDC entitled families to assistance for as
long as they qualified, TANF enforced a ban on assistance for anyone who had already been a
recipient for five years. Further, recipients became required to work after two years of receiving
assistance. Once TANF was fully implemented, the number of recipients declined steadily. In
five years, the number of caseloads halved, yielding widespread approbation for the change.
Whether declining caseloads are really a sign of success, however, is questionable. Authors like
Semuels (2016) observe that many individuals and families lost healthcare after the reforms, but
failed to find employment, leaving them struggling more than before. Having dropped off the
welfare map, their case is mistakenly interpreted as someone who successfully reintegrated into
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the exchange system, which is often not the case. Incentives to work have little impact if there
are not any jobs.
The Reagan years, followed by Bush and Clinton thus changed the perspective on grants
dramatically. All three administrations expressed concern with the fact that the availability of
government grants disincentivized participation in the exchange system, and called for grants to
become more conditional, and temporary. Grants, they argued, ought to be a short term,
transitional form of assistance, to aid those having to change jobs. For those capable of working,
they argued, grants should not become a permanent alternative to exchange. They failed to
acknowledge, however, that exchange—on its own—cannot be expected to produce a number of
jobs equal to the number of people who want to work.
Public Grants Today
While ADFC and TANF have been much contested, other grants have been relatively popular,
and continue to operate on large scale. The SSA has stood strong in supporting those who cannot
work. Medicare and Medicaid continue to operate as well, albeit under pressure. If someone is
sick, disabled, or old, most agree they still deserve to live in dignity, and thus deserve a grant
structure, so that they can sustain themselves outside of the exchange system. There is, of course,
room to disagree on how disabled, how sick, or how old someone ought to be before they can be
deemed unfit for the exchange system. Western Europe seems to have a broader definition of
being unfit for the workforce than North America, for example. But in both contexts, it is
understood that some people simply cannot work, and a grant is an appropriate method to ensure
their subsistence. These grants, of course, are grants of love; granted to relieve the suffering of
those in our community.
Then there are those who do work, but fail to earn enough. While wage growth fails to
keep up with productivity growth, many US citizens continue to find themselves in a situation
where working full time does not earn them an adequate income. Food Stamps and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) are the largest grants in effect to bridge this gap. Now relabeled as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Food Stamps provide low-income,
working households with an expenditure allowance for food. Because the unemployed do not
qualify for Food Stamps, this grant helps those who are part of the exchange economy, but for
whom their bi-weekly paycheck is insufficient to buy food. A similar logic applies to the EITC,
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which gives tax breaks to low-income families. Again, the only families that benefit are those
who are already in the exchange economy. This ensures a continued incentive to work, rather
than collect welfare checks from the couch, the logic goes. This second category of grants is
more contested than the first. While many people can agree that a full-time work week ought to
yield a living wage, not all agree that a grant is the best way to bridge the gap. Some worry about
the side effects of providing handouts like Food Stamps. Hyman Minsky (2013) for example,
points out that injecting food stamps into the system simply bids up the price of food, making it
more expensive, especially for the unemployed, who did not qualify for Food Stamps in the first
place.
Lastly, there are the people who are willing to work, but cannot find a job. If the dynamic
nature of the exchange economy is such that some percentage of the labor force will always be
between jobs, it is not unreasonable to think there ought to be grants to assist those people who
are temporarily out of work. In the US today, the grants in place are TANF and unemployment
insurance, both of which have a time constraint. The temporary nature of these grants is intended
to incentivize people to reenter the exchange economy. But with jobs continuing to be scarce and
increasingly high skilled, it appears that an incentive to work is not always enough. Some people
find themselves unable to enter the exchange economy despite a willingness to work. When their
temporary grants run out, little support is available.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the share of disposable income that government grants
have accounted for in recent decades. In 2017, total federal government social benefit spending
made up 17 percent of total income. The share accounted for by wages and salaries has steadily
declined. After reaching over 66 percent in the early 1950s, it barely surpasses 52 percent today.
Within “Social Benefit Spending,” Medicare and Medicaid have steadily increased, each
reaching approximately 4 percent today. Social Security has remained roughly constant between
5 and 6 percent since the 1980s. Unemployment insurance remains low, fluctuating between less
than 1 and 2 percent. Overall, however, the share of government grants in total income has
grown, and the share of exchange has declined over the years.
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Figure 2: Federal Grant Based and Exchange Based Income Sources
as a Percentage of Total Personal Income
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Figure 3 shows the growth in federal government grants alongside the growth in state and local
government grants. While the latter have risen, too, their increase has been modest, growing
from 1 percent of GDP in 1947 to close to 3 percent in 2016. For federal spending, the increase
in government grants has been more aggressive. Despite significant declines in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, the trend is upward. Federal government grants accounted for almost 10 percent of
GDP in 2016, up from just over 3 percent in 1947. Table 1 shows the spending amounts in
billions of dollars for 2015. Total social benefits to persons made up $2,631.2 billion

Table 1: Personal Income in 2015
Billions of
Dollars
Total Personal Income
Wages and Salaries

15,553
7,858.90

Total Government Social Benefits
Social Security
Medicare
Medicaid
Unemployment Insurance
Other

2,631.20
871.8
633.7
536
32.2
520.9

Source: NIPA Accounts

Figure 3: Social Benefits Spending (percent of GDP)
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Public Grants: Can We Afford Them?
The debate around the US government’s need to provide grants is often intertwined with a debate
about its ability to do so. Politicians on both sides of the spectrum express concern with their
cost. Social Security, especially, has been the victim of doom scenarios in which tax
contributions fail to fund the benefits owed, leaving future generations with a meager retirement
benefit claim after years of dutiful contributions.
A closer look at the way in which the government pays out benefits reveals that this is a
myth, perpetuated by those industries and individuals that would benefit from a mass
privatization effort. The government’s operations reveal the truth. Whenever the government
makes a social security payment, it does so by crediting the bank account of the recipient; the US
Federal government can literally spend it into existence.4 While this may sound baffling to some,
even Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan acknowledges its validity:
I wouldn’t say that the PAYGO benefits are insecure in the sense that
there’s nothing to prevent the Federal Government from creating as much
money as it wants and paying it to somebody. The question is how you set
up a system which assures that real assets are created which those benefits
employ to purchase. (Alan Greenspan, 2005)

Wray (2002, 26) explains this point in more detail. “Social Security is unusual because unlike
most other government programs, we pretend that a specific tax finances it,” he states. In our
imagination, Wray explains, Uncle Sam puts our social security contributions in a big jar—and
we would never want an empty jar! What we forget is that the government can reallocate funds
internally to ensure all payments are made, and most importantly, spend money into existence in
case there is not enough. As Greenspan (2005) notes, the real challenge is not in finding the cash,
but in ensuring that actual, physical resources are available for people to spend the cash on. This
is the concern for years ahead, not the affordability.
The US government may thus collect Social Security taxes, but Social Security payments
do not rely on those taxes. Does that mean you should stop paying them? Probably not. Your
Social Security taxes do form another crucial purpose: they take spending power away from the
working population. Without that, working men and women would buy all the goods and
4

A more detailed explanation is given by L. Randall Wray (1998), Charles Goodhart (1997), George Knapp (1973),
and Abba Lerner (1947).
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services for sale, leaving nothing to the elderly. This way, the Social Security tax helps allocate
the real resources among generations appropriately.
Taxes of Threat and Transfers of Love
With this insight into the operation of government spending, we can dive deeper into Boulding’s
framework. The taxes we pay can be understood as a threat-based grant, imposed on us by the
government to ensure a demand for the currency, and to manage the amount of money in
circulation. The reason we pay taxes is not dissimilar to the reason we hand over our wallets to
armed robbers—we do not want to get in trouble! Of course, it feels less painful if we believe
that the law and order of our country depends directly on our ability to finance it, and politicians
have leveraged this story. But government operations show that your neighbors’ welfare claims
cannot come out of your pockets. The government spent the money first, and asked you for taxes
later, without reducing your current consumption. As such, tax payments are a unique type of
grant. Since it is unlawful not to pay them, they can be understood as a threat grant. But because
the federal government does not rely on them to spend, they do not transfer value; this is a myth.
Therefore, taxes are a unique kind of threat grant: one that serves a systemic purpose in the
economy.
The grants we receive from the government can be understood as love-based grants. We
receive them, not because we did something in return. We receive them because it has been
decided that our well-being is important. Just like a family gives to their children because they
care, so does the government give to its people, so they may avoid unnecessary suffering. And
due to the operational structure described above, the federal government is unconstrained in its
ability to provide such grants.
As such, the threat-based grants we pay, and the love-based grants we may receive do not
have to add up to the same amount. They are not two sides of an exchange. They each are grants,
serving different purposes, in different ways. Both keep the nation together. Once we recognize
this, it can change out perception of government grant recipients. If we see that our tax payments
do not fund our neighbor’s healthcare bill, we do not have to get annoyed at him for smoking a
pack a day. That way, the resentment towards people receiving public assistance can be lessened,
shifting the public perception of government grants.
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Concluding Remarks
Immediately following the Great Depression, it was obvious that something was needed to
supplement the exchange economy. President Roosevelt provided grants to those who could not
work, and created jobs for those who could. Boosting the exchange economy, and introducing a
supplementary system of public grants, he successfully resuscitated the capitalist order. The
Kennedy-Johnson administration followed with the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, but
grew concerned with the number of people that relied on grants instead of exchange. Declaring
“War on Poverty,” they set up education and training programs that would help citizens gain the
skills necessary to function in exchange, but with little success, for exchange itself was in need
of a boost. Nixon and Carter also attempted reform with direct contributions to exchange in the
form of CETA, but it was Reagan and Clinton who had the biggest impact. Stressing the
advantages of exchange over grants, they reduced the availability grants for those who could
work but found themselves without a job, and fostered a renewed faith in the exchange economy.
Today, grants for those who cannot work are still in effect through the SSA, and largely
regarded as a success. Grants for those who work but fail to earn enough show up as SNAP, and
EITC. Grants for those who are out of work are TANF, and unemployment insurance, both
temporary. The exchange economy itself has not seen much of a boost since Roosevelt and
WWII directly added jobs to the system. Since the 1970s, a renewed faith in exchange gave rise
to the notion that the exchange system is on track, but citizens are not. As such, citizens have
been equipped with job training programs, and temporary grants, only to be kicked back into an
exchange system. The expectation that anyone falling back on grants should do so very
temporarily. Longer use of public assistance is considered a disgrace.
This reasoning, however, overestimates the exchange system’s capability to supply
enough jobs, and perpetuates a flawed interpretation of government operations. Since the
government does not actually rely on your tax payments to pay your neighbor’s claims, his
reliance on them is not the reason for your tight vacation budget. Your tax payments are a threatbased grant, to support the monetary system. Your neighbor’s public assistance is a love-based
grant, designed to allow for him to live in dignity. Both serve an important purpose in our
economy.
Since the New Deal, the government has refrained from providing employment in the
exchange economy directly, instead of grants, to provide for those in need. But since grants are
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now highly conditional and temporary, they only provide a partial remedy for the gaps in the
exchange system. The remainder is left to other sources of grants, particularly families. The next
chapter will show how families have picked up the slack of the exchange system by providing
their children with grants that increasingly extend into adulthood.

IV. FAMILY GRANTS IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD
If there are gaps in exchange that government grants do not fill, families often step in to supply
grants to the best of their ability. One way is parents providing for their children while they are
not yet fit for exchange. Boulding (1981) argues they do this out of love. Most parents’
wellbeing is partly informed by their children’s wellbeing, which means their utility functions
are connected. Child labor laws further reinforce this structure; it is unlawful for a child to be
participating in the exchange economy before the age of 14, and the number of labor hours is
restricted until the age of 16 (US Department of Labor 2016). As such, childhood is highly grants
dominated. Adulthood, on the other hand, is exchange dominated. Provided there are no
disabilities at play, most grown children are expected to provide for themselves in the exchange
economy until retirement. Parents (and other relatives) may remain on standby to help in case of
trouble, but economic independence in adulthood is the expectation in most US families. Of
course, adults who are supported by their spouse form an exception to this rule.
The period of transition out of family grants and into exchange thus presents an
interesting angle from which to better understand the role of family grants in the US economy
today. When the transition takes place and how it differs among young adults can inform us
about the ways in which family grants step in to bridge the gaps in exchange economy that
young adults face. For that reason, this transition is the focus of this chapter. I explore the
reasons for longer reliance on family grants today, and the inequalities of young adults’ access to
those grants. I find that family grants help young adults from high income households cope with
the challenges of our modern economy while others are left struggling, and explore the
distributional consequences of this trend.
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Longer Reliance on Family Grants
Today’s young adults take longer to transition into exchange than earlier generations; an
increasing share of people rely on family grants during their twenties. Parents’ help is most
common for young adults that are enrolled in school, employed in low-paying jobs, or unable to
work in the exchange economy due to other circumstances. I will discuss each scenario in turn,
starting with school enrollment.
Before children can enter the exchange economy, they first need to acquire the necessary
education. In 1975, three quarters of the population did not complete more than a high school
degree, but that is different today. Demand for low skilled labor has dropped dramatically,
making it difficult to earn a living wage without at least some higher education. As a result,
many more people pursue a college degree. Vespa (2017) show that 32.5 percent of Americans
above the age of 25 attain a bachelor’s degree or more (Table 2). Naturally, doing so delays their
entrance into the exchange economy. Compared to those in Generation X, Millennials are now
more educated, but earn less. Figure 4 shows that 41.5 percent of female Millennials in the labor
force have at least a bachelor’s degree, and 31.4 percent of male Millennials do. These shares are
not as high for those in Generation X, where 33.3 percent of female labor force participants had a
Bachelor’s degree, and 28.1 percent of males did. Figure 5 shows their median earnings, by
generation, gender, and educational attainment. We can see that Generation X earned more at
every level. For men with at least a bachelor’s degree, median income is $63K for Generation X,
but $57K for Millennials. For women with at least a Bachelor’s degree, median income is $49K
for Generation X, and $47K for Millennials (Anderson and Martinez 2017).
Students do work while being enrolled in college—in 2015, 44.5 percent of 18 to 24 year
old college students did so (Vespa 2017). But the price of higher education has risen rapidly,
making it difficult to support oneself with part-time employment. Consequently, completing a
college degree requires access to grants of some kind. If college years are understood as an
extension of childhood, family grants appear as the obvious choice. As such, it is no surprise that
most students rely on financial help from their parents to cover tuition and living expenses while
they attend college.
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Figure 4: Proportion of Civilian Labor Force with Bachelor’s Degree
or Higher by Sex

Source: US Census Bureau

Figure 5: Median Earnings for Full-Time Year-Round Employed People,
by Sex and Educational Attainment

Source: US Census Bureau
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Table 2: Educational Attainment of the US Population Above the Age of 25 in 2015

Source: Vespa, 2017

Around the age of 22—23, full-time school enrollment rates drop, and full-time
employment rates pick up. In 2011, 51.7 percent of 21—22 year olds were enrolled in school full
time but only 21.7 percent of 23—24 year olds were. Conversely, the full-time employment was
34.3 percent for 21—22 year olds, and 57.6 percent for 23—34 year olds (Wightman, Patrick,
and Schoeni 2013). This indicates that it is common for young adults to enter the exchange
economy at this point. Frequently, however, family grants do not stop here. Many parents keep
supporting their children after they complete their higher education. The literature suggests that
parents provide financial assistance to children that suffer negative life-events or cope with
unemployment or low incomes.
Berry (2008) observes that if parents have several children, the needier children receive
more assistance, where need arises not just from low income, but also from having a child or
being underemployed. These trends are consistent with Boulding’s theory. Parents provide their
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children with grants because they care about their wellbeing, not because they hope their efforts
will be reciprocated. For if parents were more motivated by the latter, they would give more to
their high-performing children who would be expected to reciprocate best. Next, we examine the
two main ways in which family grants manifest: co-residence and money transfers.
Co-Residence and Money Transfers
While some parents equip their children with a credit card, others remove an otherwise costly
expense by granting them a place to live. The literature provides a good overview of the trends in
this area. Table 3 shows that in 2015, only one-in-three 18—34 year olds lived in their parents’
home. Only in 6 states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Wyoming, Nebraska) did most
young people live independently. In all other states, living with parents or roommates was more
common, and increasingly so. Between 2005 and 2015, all states saw an increase in the
percentage of young adults living at home. North Dakota was the only state where that
percentage went down (by 3.5 percent) (Vespa 2017). The states where the 2015 percentages
were the highest were New Jersey (46.9), Connecticut (41.6 percent), New York (40.6 percent),
Florida (38.3 percent), and California (38.1 percent).
This suggests that high living expenses are the main reason why young adults continue to
live their parents’ home, or return there after being away. Of those 18—24 year olds that were
living in their parents’ homes in 2015, 53 percent were enrolled in school (full time or part time).
A share of 38.4 percent was employed part time, 17.8 percent was employed full time, and 10.1
percent was unemployed. Among the employed, 94.8 percent earned less than $29,999 per year.
For this age group of young adults, co-residence offsets costs during their time in school, or
during a time of low-income work. If we look at young adults of a higher age group, however,
the trends change. For those aged 25—34, a third still lives at home. And within that group living
at home, 25 percent are neither in school nor working; they are either unemployed or not in the
labor force. If we look closer at that subset (Table 4) we see that 27.6 percent of them report
having one of six disabilities.5

5

Disabilities include hearing difficulty, vision difficulty, cognitive difficulty, ambulatory difficulty, self-care
difficulty, or independent living difficulty.
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Table 3: Living Arrangements of Young Adults Ages 18-34 in 2005 and 2015

Source: Vespa (2017)
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Further, 21.4 percent have a child, and only 29.1 percent have a bachelor’s degree or more
(Vespa 2017). For the young adults in this group, co-residence may be a means to provide
support in a context of health complications, or to assist with child-rearing. But it may also
mitigate the consequences of being unable to find work at low levels of education.
For those adults who do live away from their parents, family grants occur as money
transfers. Wightman et al (2013) break such transfers down by age category. For those aged 23—
24, they find that 47 percent received financial assistance in 1982, while 68 percent did in 2011.
Among those aged 25—26, that share increased from 35 percent to 48 percent during the same
period. Lastly, those aged 25—26 had a 25 percent likelihood of receiving financial assistance in
1985, which climbed to 32 percent in 2011.

Table 4: Economic and Demographic Characteristics of 18-24 Year
Olds Living at Home in 2016

Source: Vespa (2017)
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For the those aged 19—22, the amount of financial support provided also increased.
Among those receiving support in 1980, only 39 percent received high levels of support—where
high-level support means that parents’ financial assistance constituted 60—100 percent of the
recipient’s total income. In 2011, that share had risen to 52 percent. This trend is not as
pronounced among those aged 23 and up. For them, it is just the proportion of individuals
receiving assistance that increased. This suggests that the rise in grants to the younger cohorts is
a response to the increasing costs of education, as those younger cohorts are more likely to be
enrolled in school.

Demographic Differences
Both the likelihood of living at home, and the likelihood of receiving money transfers differ by
race. While blacks and Hispanics have higher percentage likelihoods of co-residing, Whites are
more likely to receive money transfers. Using an age category of 18—34, Copen, Daniels, and
Vespa (2012) find that 37 percent of young adult blacks live at home and 32 percent of young
adult Hispanics do. White and Asian young adults have a lower likelihood of living with their
parents; their shares are 30 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Wightman, Schoeni and
Robinson (2013) show that whites are most likely to receive money transfers from their parents.
For Blacks, Hispanics, and others, the likelihood of receiving such financial is on average 3.4,
4.0, and 1.7 percentage points lower compared to whites.
Wightman’s (2013) analysis of young adults between 2005-2009 showed that the amount
of assistance given varies strongly with parents’ socioeconomic status. For young adults
(18—23) whose parents fall into the top quartile of the income distribution, financial assistance
was six times higher than the assistance received by young adults with parents in the bottom
quartile. Wightman, Schoeni, and Schulenberg (2013) conduct a similar analysis, looking at
young adults aged 19—28, and ask if disparities in parental giving have grown between 1978
and 2001. They confirm that early adults with college-educated parents were consistently more
like to receive financial assistance than those whose parents’ education levels were less than
college. Berry (2008), too, observes this trend. He finds that only 6.4 percent of young adults
whose parents’ incomes fall into the bottom 20 percent receive assistance. For the top 20 percent,
that’s 33.2 percent.
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Figure 6: Money Transfers (Parental Support) by Age Cohort

Source: Wightman, Shoeni, and Robinson (2013)

As such, households of higher economic status provide their children with more support
than households of lower economic status, who may have a room to spare, but are not as likely to
provide money transfers. If the availability of family grants during young adulthood lead people
to earn more when they do enter the exchange system, this may exacerbate existing inequalities.
Recently, Swartz, McLaughlin, and Mortimer (2017) investigated whether this is the case, by
examining the impact of parental assistance during young adults’ twenties on their income in
their early thirties. They use longitudinal survey data from the Youth Development Study, which
began by surveying 1,010 participants (then ninth graders) in 1988, and lasted twenty years. In
their analysis, the authors distinguish between three kinds of parental assistance: (1) assistance
with the expenses of pursuing higher education; (2) assistance with living expenses during a time
of need (e.g. after a break up, due to disease); and (3) assistance with living expenses in absence
of such needs.
The authors find that parental assistance towards students’ education is associated with
lower grade-point averages, but higher likelihood of graduating within five years. But they find
no significant influence on young adults’ earnings in their early thirties. This result was the same
for parental assistance given in context of a specific need and without such need, and across
gender. When it comes to determining long-term earnings, they conclude that periods of
unemployment and serious injuries are much better predictors. Counter to some scholars’
expectations, this indicates that family grants fail to assist young adults in securing financial
security, at least not in time for their early thirties.
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These findings are disconcerting because they suggest that even after receiving the family
grants that allow for additional education or other preparation, earnings do not go up by the
young adults’ early thirties. This appears reassuring, since it suggests that the unequal
distribution of access to family grants need not directly translate into an increase of inequalities
in the exchange system. But some skepticism is appropriate here. First, the sample is small and
restricted to those who attended Minnesota Public Schools. Second, the findings do not rule out
that unequal access to parental assistance does not create significant variation in the quality of
life for young adults. Neither does it imply that family grants do not pay off at a later age,
perhaps by the mid-thirties of the adult child. Third, their findings do not showcase the influence
of parental assistance on wealth. It is conceivable that young adults who receive parental
assistance acquire significantly less debt, allowing them to accumulate wealth later in life. This
does not reveal itself in their earned income at 31, but could nevertheless influence inequity
subsequently. The literature falls short on these topics.
In sum, family grants may be regarded as a substitute for exchange income, which serve
to meet young adults’ needs while the exchange economy is unable to absorb them, likely
allowing them to circumvent debt and increase their level of education. Whether or not they
serve to increase earnings later in life by making further education and preparation for the
exchange system possible remains in question. Findings by Swartz, McLaughlin, and Mortimer
(2017) suggest they do not, in which case it can be concluded that family grants treat the
symptoms, and prevent additional complications, but fail to solve the problem. However, given
this study is characterized by the above-mentioned limitations, the inequality-increasing effects
of an unequally distributed access to family grants cannot be ruled out. To further understand the
economic situation of young adults, it is useful to also briefly examine the government grants
available at this point in life.
Government Grants for Young Adults
For young adults coping with the cost of school, unemployment, low wages, or disability,
government grants like the Pell Grant, unemployment insurance, SNAP, and Social Security
intend to offset some unmet needs for family grants. First initiated by Nixon as the Basic
Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG), Pell Grants are need-based government grants for
college students. Initiated to create “equal educational opportunity,” they supported their first
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class of freshman in 1973. Since then, participation in the program has grown fast. By 1980, the
number of recipients had reached 2.5 million, which grew to 4 million by 1993 and to 9.2 million
by 2012 (Mullin 2013). To receive a Pell Grant, students must fall below a certain income
bracket. In 2005, close to one in four recipients were black, and one in five were Hispanic.
Unlike non-recipients, the majority of Pell Grant students (57 percent) support themselves, i.e.
do not receive significant family grants (Fastweb 2011). This suggests that their access to family
grants is limited, and Pell Grants are the substitute. Over the years, however, the share of Pell
Grants in the financial aid package has decreased (Ehrenberg 2000). The growing gap between
college costs and Pell Grants awarded suggests that the program has failed to keep up with the
increasing costs and demands for education, forcing students to finance the gap with
unsubsidized loans (Duffy and Goldberg 2014).
Once young adults complete college—or if they choose not to pursue higher education—
they may experience low-wage jobs and periods of unemployment. For them, programs like
SNAP, and Unemployment Insurance attempt to mitigate consequences. Similarly, young adults
that are unable to work due to a disability can turn to the Social Security Act. Extensively
discussed in the previous chapter, these programs provide a base level of resources provided the
individual meets eligibility requirements.
Although some consider them substitutes, there are fundamental differences between
family grants and government grants that make it tough for the latter to make up for an absence
of the former. Today, government grants require recipients to meet eligibility requirements, and
submit paper work. If admitted, grants are temporary, and low. Today’s government grants are so
minimal that surviving on them alone has become difficult (Jencks and Edin 2017). Family
grants, on the other hand, have no upper boundary, and no defined time frame. Supplied by
individuals with insight into the recipient’s situation, they can target specific needs in specific
ways. Government grants provide blanket solutions without much regard for individual needs. It
is a mistake to view government grants as an adequate substitute for grants supplied by the
family.
While family grants may frequently exceed government grants in value, government
grants carry a greater stigma, as a result of two factors. First, there is the mistaken belief that
government grants are financed with the tax contributions of other citizens. As such, every
welfare recipient is thought to deprive hard-working tax payers of disposable income. Family

43

grants, on the other hand, do not seem to hurt anyone else. Second, family grants fall within what
may be called the “sympathy scope,” while government grants do not. Parents sympathize with
their child’s wellbeing, and can provide a grant voluntarily, out of love; these grants are personal.
Government grants, while also given out of love for the community that is the nation, are
structured to bridge a sympathy gap; they are impersonal. Consequently, tax payers take no issue
with 26-year old John whose parents pay his rent while he interns at a non-profit. Most do not
care how much money John’s mom spends on him, because she did not steal it from them. But
some resent 25-year old Angela for relying on unemployment insurance while she looks for jobs.
They cannot sympathize with her.
Such resentment is unjustified for two reasons. First, neither young adult could sustain
themselves, given the circumstances of the modern economy. One had family grants to turn to
while the other—through no fault of her own—did not. Second, Angela’s unemployment
insurance does not deprive other citizens of anything. Financed by the federal government, it
represents an injection into the private economy. Her grant receipt provides her with purchasing
power, which increases aggregate demand. It does not take anything away from other citizens,
because—counter to popular belief—it need not be funded by tax payers’ money.

Concluding Remarks
In recent decades, the exchange system has undergone a transformation. The demand for lowskilled labor has declined, and wages have failed to keep up with increasing productivity. Higher
education improves job prospects significantly, but its price tag has risen rapidly. And even once
a degree is acquired, low-wage jobs and periods of unemployment are not uncommon. Today’s
young adults are more educated, but earn less (Anderson and Martinez 2017). Consequently,
young adults’ parental assistance now extends well into their twenties. For some, this is not a
problem. As parents’ wellbeing is partly formed by that of their children, those who have the
resources tend to be glad to provide. But the resources are distributed far from equally, and many
households do not have the income necessary to cover expenses for their adult child, causing
them to rely on Pell Grants or other government substitutes, which tend to be insufficient in
scope, carry a stigma, and are frequently supplemented by loans, thus indebting the young adult
at an early age. Unequal access to family grants thus yields significant differences in the
livelihoods of young adults. Work by Swartz, McLaughlin, and Mortimer (2017) suggests that
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the impact on earnings is insignificant, which implies that parental assistance may prevent things
from getting worse, but hardly allow them to get better. However, a more robust empirical
assessment of the inequality increasing effects of family grants would require measurement of
the impact later in life, account for wealth effects, and use a larger sample.

V. PRIVATE GRANTS
Private grants are one-way transfers that are provided neither by the government, nor by family.
Rather, they are granted by individuals, corporations, or non-profit organizations in the form of
charitable or philanthropic gifts—where philanthropy is referred to as a more strategic effort than
charity. In the US, private grants are not insignificant. During the past half century, total giving
has fluctuated around 2 percent of GDP, totaling as much as $373.25 billion in 2015. Of this
sum, 71 percent was given by individuals, 16 percent was given by foundations, and 5 percent
was given by corporations. Bequests made up the remaining 9 percent. The largest share of those
charitable gifts (32 percent) were directed towards religious organizations. The next biggest
share (15 percent) went to education and human services organizations (12 percent), which
includes those responding to crises with emergency care and supplies. Foundations like United
Way and other funds received 11 percent of gifts. Another 8 percent went to health
organizations, 5 percent to the arts and humanities, 4 percent to international affairs, and 2
percent to environmental causes (Giving USA 2016).
In Boulding’s framework, charitable gifts fall into the category of love-based grants.
Although private grantors may enjoy seeing their name on the wall, they do not demand a
specific return on their gift other than the increased wellbeing of the grantee. At least in
principle, private grantors provide their grants because they care, and not because they are
responding to a threat. Boulding (1962) suggests this explains why mainstream economics has
failed to provide proper economic analysis of private grants. As orthodox models assume
rational, utility-maximizing behavior, economists are tempted to argue that philanthropists only
give because they receive “a certain glow of emotional virtue” in return. Boulding (1962),
however, argues that this explanation fails to capture the true dynamic of a private grant. If you
give a dollar to a panhandler on the New York City subway, the transfer of assets from you to
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him is clear; it is a certain money amount. The transfer of “emotional virtue” from him to you,
however, is “mysterious.” This mysteriousness makes the transaction a grant, not an exchange.
Boulding (1962, 62) puts forth the idea that the care that motivates grantors springs from
their self-identification with the grantee. A philanthropic donation, he argues, is a grantor’s
“expression of his sense of community with others.” The stronger an individual’s identification
with a certain cause or group, the greater the likelihood for that individual to provide donations
to it. Just like parents provide family grants because they identify with their children, so do
private grantors provide donations to those in their hometown, to those who share their
ambitions, or to those who face the same challenges they once did. Private grants thus operate on
the same principle as family grants, but they extend the scope to a larger community. As the
community grows larger, however, it can become increasingly difficult to sympathize with the
grantees. At the very large scale, individuals are often unable to sympathize with the recipients
of their grants, and will thus be unlikely to supply the grant out of love. That is where the
government has to step in and ensure that enough love-based grants are provided. (Boulding
1962). In this way, private grants and government grants can do the same thing through different
methods.
Given that private grants can transfer resources to those who are underserved by the
exchange system, philanthropic efforts have the capacity to reduce the inequality that the
exchange system brings about, or to relieve the hardship for those who are underserved by it. The
degree to which they live up to that potential is the subject of this chapter. I investigate both
individual and institutional private grants, and observe that while their scope is impressive, they
fail to fill the greatest gaps in exchange. With resources being directed primarily at religious
organizations and private educational institutions, and tax incentives being greatest for those
grantors who are least likely to sympathize with those in greatest need, only a small share of
private grants are supplied to meet the basic needs of disadvantaged citizens, and help reduce the
hardships of inequality and/or joblessness.

Individual Private Grants
Individual private grants are vast in the US. During a public event in 2006, Warren Buffet called
Bill Gates on stage, and pledged $30 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Other
major grantors of recent years include Facebook’s Marc Zuckerberg, who gave $990 million to

46

the Silicon Valley Community Foundations; Nike’s Phil Knight, who gave $500 million to the
University of Oregon; and Microsoft’s Paul Allen, who gave $300 million to brain research.
Individual giving makes up the bulk of philanthropy and charity in the US. Channeling money
into education, arts, and science, the wealthiest Americans perform roles that other nations leave
to their governments (Bishop 2013).
US tax law suggests a substitutability between such individual philanthropy and
government spending. Individuals who make a charitable contribution can deduct their donations
from their taxable income. When donating to public charities, those deductions can reach up to
50 percent of taxable income. For private charities, 30 percent of taxable income is the cap. With
this structure, fewer taxes are taken from individuals who gave to a (certified) charity of their
choice. This way, giving a dollar in charity costs the grantor less than a dollar (List 2011). The
logic is that a philanthropist gives a grant out of love, and gets rewarded by having to pay less in
taxes. The more charitable giving you do, the fewer tax contributions are required of you. But if
you do not give to charity, the government wants all your taxes.
But these tax deductions are not the same for everyone. The higher your income, the
higher your deduction. So those individuals in the highest income brackets have the greatest
incentives to engage in charity and philanthropy. This might seem intuitive, because the more
someone earns, the more capacity for charity they have. As such, providing them with a greater
incentive to share might make sense. But it has a side effect. As discussed in the previous
section, Boulding suggests that individuals give private grants out of sympathy for the grantee
(Boulding 1962). But if the grantor is very wealthy, he may not sympathize with the very poor
He may sympathize instead with his alma mater, or the industry he is a part of. As such,
providing the largest benefits to the wealthiest grantors may influence what types of private
grants are given the most.
Reich’s (2013) work confirms this mechanism. Wondering how much of individual
grants go towards meeting the basic needs of the nation’s disadvantaged, he concludes it’s not
very much, especially not if the grantor has a high income. He finds that grantors who earn less
than $100,000 per year dedicate around 10 percent of their charitable gifts to meeting others’
basic needs. For those who earn more than $100,000 only 5 percent of their philanthropic efforts
go toward this goal.
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So where do all the individual private grants go instead? For those whose income is less
than $100,000 per year, the bulk goes to religious institutions. And although churches do use
some of those funds to help the neediest (e.g. soup kitchens), Wuthnow (2004) estimates that
such activities only make up around 5 percent of the total; the rest goes towards their operational
costs and upkeep. For those whose income is more than $100,000 per year, much of the grants
are channeled into education. Reich argues that here, too, only a small share is channeled
towards those who are in greatest need of assistance. The bulk goes to the endowments of
wealthy private institutions. Of course, unrestricted gifts do not prevent the receiving university
from using the donations towards scholarships for those applications that do not have the
financial resources for mindboggling tuition levels. Some of this does happen. But it is not
enough to make up for the inadequacy of the Pell Grant program discussed earlier.
So even if the US is sometimes referred to as the most charitable country in the world,
there is not that much charity—in the sense of providing basic needs. Those who are
unemployed, hungry, unable to afford childcare, or without a decent place to live are not the
main recipients of private grants. Of course, they may still benefit from private grants that fund
public goods such as museums, parks, churches, and other community centers. Such public
goods may indeed improve the well-being of all US citizens. But they do little to reduce
economic inequality or mitigate the hardships of joblessness and as the income distribution
worsens, change is unlikely. Because if a growing income gap between grantor and grantee
makes it more difficult for the former to sympathize with the latter, this could further reduce the
share of charity going toward basic needs.
In extreme cases, sympathy levels drop so far that individual charity becomes a tool to
argue that the nations’ wealthiest deserve to be uplifted, and taxes should be raised on the poor.
Author Chrystia Freeland (2012) offers some anecdotal evidence for this tendency in Plutocrats.
In an interview with Foster Friess, a mutual fund investor, Friess argues that the common good is
served best when the wealthy support charities of their selection, rather than the government
supporting people through transfers. He adds that it is the “top 1 percent that probably
contributes more to making the world a better place than the 99 percent” and that he has “never
seen any poor people do what Bill Gates has done.” According to Fries, the Americans at the
bottom of the distribution are the free riders, Freeland explains. His sympathy for his potential
grantees is close to zero.

48

Of course, the story is not always this simplistic. Whether increasing inequality will
further reduce the share of private grants going to basic needs depends not just on the inequality
levels, but on the societal perspective on that inequality. Winterich and Zhang (2014) pose that it
is the degree to which a society has come to expect and accept inequities of power and wealth
that influence charitable behavior, not the inequities themselves. The authors conclude that
societies and individuals that expect and accept inequities feel less pressure to share their wealth
through charity. But Winterich and Zhang do not investigate which purposes the charitable gifts
serve. The scope of charity may not decline so long as inequality is not expected, but the
destinations of charity dollars may increasingly fail to serve those who need charity the most.
Rather, they will serve the wishes of their grantors.
Authors like Acs (2011) and Bishop (2013) have also reflected on the increasing presence
of large individual donors, and they argue that their influence is so big that they are morphing the
economic system into something best described as philanthrocapitalism. Using their vast private
grants, the world’s wealthiest individuals can push their agendas of choice without being
constrained by political incentives like re-election. Because they do not need to persuade an
electorate, they can take risks and provide resources to controversial matters. When used
appropriately, this power can of course be hugely beneficial to society. But it also represents an
undermining of democracy, with potentially grave consequences.
As such, tax law makes individual grants look like a substitute for government spending.
But because private donors are not democratically elected and operate on their own will, their
charitable gifts may go towards a very different goal from the one the government would have
chosen. That goal may be more beneficial or less beneficial than the government alternative; as
with any counter-factual determining this is tricky. But Reich (2013) finds that just 5—10
percent of individual private grants help meet the basic needs of the disadvantaged. Individual
giving was $265 billion in 2015, but if just ten percent of that went to basic needs, that is $26.5
billion, which is a lot less impressive. Especially when compared to the $2,631 billion that the
government paid out in social benefits that year (Table 1).
Another reason that individual philanthropy makes for a questionable substitute for
government spending is that it is procyclical in nature. When the economy does well, it goes up.
When the economy does poorly, it goes down. Evidence for this is presented by Acs (2011), who
shows that between 1929 and 1959, when the US government was large, private domestic
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philanthropy did not shrink. Rather, it grew from 1.7 to 2.3 percent of GDP. List (2011) confirms
that individual private grants are procyclical, rather than countercyclical. Plotting the S&P 500
stock index alongside individual charitable gifts between 1968 and 2008, he finds that a 1
percent rise in last year’s S&P corresponds to a 0.19 percent increase in charitable giving this
year. Individual givers, he concludes, are more responsive to economic upturns than they are to
downturns (List 2011). This suggests that the grantor’s feelings of optimism and profitability are
a greater driving force for charity than the actual degree of need for economic assistance among
grantees. Tropman (1978) confirms this trend for the US in the 1960s and the 1970s. Private
charity, he finds, does not expand much when public charity contracts, or the other way around.
He concludes that rather than substituting for each other, the two seem to move together.
A third reason why substitutability between the two is low is unlike public grants, private
grants are constrained by individuals’ income; even Bill Gates cannot give away more than he
has accumulated. The federal government, however, has flexibility, because it is the sole issuer
of the US dollar. Its expenditures are not funded by its tax receipts, so its ability to issue grants is
not constrained in the same way. It creates income by spending dollars into the economy, and
reduces it through taxes. So, if Bill Gates enjoys a big federal tax deduction in a given year, that
just means fewer dollars are drained from the economy that year. That does not mean the federal
government will suddenly be unable to provide welfare payments to citizens, since the federal
spending is not constrained by tax receipts. If we recognize this, we can understand private
grants as complements to—not substitutes for—government grants.
Therefore, the substitution of charitable gifts for tax payments (and government
spending) is only relevant at the state level. This is because individual states cannot sustainably
run budget deficits, which makes their spending dependent on their citizens’ tax payments. If
everyone suddenly gave more to charity and maximized their state level tax deductions at the
same time, the resulting drop in tax revenue could put that states budget under stress. At the
federal level, however, this is not the case.

Institutional Private Grants
In the US, being a charitable organization, and thus being tax exempt, requires that the
organization’s purpose be limited to one or more tax-exempt purposes, and that the organization
abstain from a range of activities, including political campaigning, or pursuing private interests.
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Sections 501(c), 501(c)(3), and 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code outline these rules in detail.
The number of non-profit organizations of this kind has expanded rapidly in recent years.
Between 1995 and 2005, the number of registered charitable, religious, and non-profit
organizations rose from 181,000 to 286,000 (Reich 2013). In 2012, public charities—registered
as 501(c)(3)—made up three quarters of the non-profit sector’s revenue ($1.65 trillion)
(McKeever and Petijohn 2014). Reich (2013, 523) argues this number is so high because it is
abnormally easy to become a tax-exempt non-profit in the US. The only real requirement, he
claims, “is that revenue not be distributed as profit to shareholders or investors.”
Foundations fall into the 501(c)(3) tax exempt category. Because their sole purpose is to
provide private grants, their gifts are not as volatile as those of individuals. But over the years,
they did undergo a shift in the purpose of their giving. In the early twentieth century, foundations
worked closely with the poor in the alleviation of social problems. But after the World War II,
the American economy was prosperous, GNP quadrupled between 1940 and 1960, real wages
rose at 3 percent annually, and workers received good healthcare and pensions. In this context,
foundations began to move away from their initial focus on welfare. In 1964, the Foundation
Center declared that “welfare, like health, has been declining in proportion of foundation grants,”
citing the introduction of Blue Cross, Blue Shield, retirement funds, and an expanded
government sector as reasons for the decline (Anheier and Hammack 2010).
List (2011) confirms this response to government expansion for the non-profit sector as a
whole. If the government starts or expands a service that used to be performed by the non-profit
sector, organizations will refer clients to the government program, and shift their own resources
elsewhere. In the case of foundations, resources were shifted toward more strategic goals,
allowing gifts to push an agenda, and establish influence, rather than fulfill the basic needs of
America’s disadvantaged. When the economy proved more challenging in the later years of the
twentieth century, however, these adjustments were scaled back somewhat, allowing social
welfare to be the top destination of foundation grants again in the 1980s. By 1995, however,
education and health exceeded social welfare (Anheier and Hammack 2010).
Today, education remains the number one destination for foundation grants. Authors
Frumkin and Kaplan (2010) suggest education’s popularity can be explained in two ways. First,
education has long been understood to form a pathway out of poverty. In many people’s eyes,
education continues to be America’s great equalizer. Second, supplying grants to educational
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institutions allow foundations to channel money into the sciences and the arts. The distribution of
foundation grant money across educational institutions, however, is remarkably uneven. The
authors find that 72 percent of foundation grants go to universities, and 15 percent to colleges.
Organizations for technical education and community colleges receive much less; 9 percent and
2 percent of gifts, respectively. Looking more closely at the biggest recipients, the distribution is
even more startling. Of the 2,500 higher education institutions that received a foundation grant in
2001, 25 received 30 percent of the money (Frumkin and Kaplan 2010). The list is unsurprising:
Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Yale, etc.
Not every foundation grant to education is the same, though. Some grants target
increased access to education for underserved groups like minorities, women, and the poor.
Others aim to support community building activities, and a third group serves to improve the
quality of education. A fourth category of grants targets research initiatives, fueling the
advancement of knowledge. A last group provides the capital for major construction efforts. The
first category in this list does serve to alleviate the inequality enhancing issues discussed in the
previous chapter. Scholarships for students who do not have the means to pay for higher
education help to reduce the socioeconomic gap between them and their peers. It is reassuring to
see that scholarships do make up a quarter of the grants provided by foundations. But their dollar
amount is still relatively low compared to the other grant categories. In 2003, only 6.4 percent of
grant dollars went to scholarships. The bulk went to institutional development which, although
strong academic institutions are useful to society at large, may do little to address the inequality
that characterizes the US economy today.
Although education continues to be a popular focus, many foundations have recently
declared inequality reduction to be their primary goal. The Ford Foundation has showcased a
clear concern for the matter, with a website that promises that “addressing inequality is at the
center of everything we do.” This is a promising shift of focus. Eisenberg (2015), however,
expresses concern that this focus is just a fad, and will accomplish little. Inequality is a complex
problem which nothing short of a job guarantee will fix, he argues. More on this later.
Although corporations are legally obliged to maximize stock market value for their
shareholders, many of them partake in charitable giving, too. Some have come to embrace
strategic philanthropy; a form of charity that yields favorable conditions for the grantor
(Brudney and Ferrell 2002). In this case, the grant is portrayed as yielding no return for the
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grantor, making the gift a tax-deductible one. But at the same time, the grant is argued to provide
a more favorable public image, or otherwise beneficial conditions. This allows acts of charity to
be reconciled with corporations’ legal obligation to maximize shareholder value. It is often
described as “Doing Well by Doing Good” (Bishop 2013). Some corporations cash in on this
mechanism in times of disaster. A hurricane, for example, can yield significant economic stress
in the affected region. In such a situation, a corporate grant for the victims can boost the
company’s stock price, and regenerate optimism in the economy (Mueller and Kräussl 2011).
Organizations like United Way have helped scale corporate giving by serving as a middle man
between the grantor and the grantee. Now the biggest non-profit in the world, the organization
pools gifts from individuals as well as corporations, and distributes them among recipients
around the world. Corporations can leverage their contributions to generate a favorable image.
Many businesses encourage all employees to give annually, aggressively upholding a 100
percent participation rate (Keating, Pitts, and Appel 1981).

Concluding Remarks
Increasing inequality looks like a gap in exchange that could be remedied by grants. The more
wealth accumulates at the top, the more the rich can give away. The less the poor have, the more
they will rely on gifts from the rich. Over the course of the twentieth century, both inequities and
philanthropic efforts have grown. Consequentially, private grants seem like an obvious
mechanism to reduce these disparities. But a closer look at both individual and institutional
private grants shows that the bulk of gifts do not help meet the basic needs of those at the
bottom. Individual grantors largely provide grants to causes with which they sympathize, and
usually do not include those in greatest needs. As inequality increases, sympathy between those
most capable of granting and those most in need of grants may decline. Similarly, foundations
channel the bulk of their funds into higher education, but within that group, send most money to
those institutions that are already rich. Reich (2013, 523) sums it up by saying that “rather than a
mechanism for redistribution or relief for the poor, philanthropy appears to be more about the
pursuit of one’s own projects; a mechanism for the expression of one’s values or preferences.”
As large as philanthropic efforts may be in the United States, it is thus unwise to rely on them to
meet the basic needs of those who are disadvantaged by the exchange system. Not only will
philanthropists pursue their own agendas, they are also likely to give in a procyclical manner,
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and will always remain constrained in their spending ability. The federal government’s spending,
however, is not constrained in the same way. It is fully capable to provide the grants that are
needed, when they are needed, and where they are needed. As such, the former is no substitute
for the latter.

VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Thus far, we have explored the role of government grants, family grants, and private grants and
reviewed their ability to complement the exchange economy, particularly in areas of inequality
and unemployment. In the case of government grants, we have observed the growth of grants
such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which continue to provide support to those
who cannot work due to old age or disability. The working poor and the unemployed, however,
have seen ups and downs over the course of the twentieth century. During New Deal, the WPA,
and the CCC directly employed hundreds of thousands of Americans who were willing to work
but unable to find private sector employment; this direct expansion of the exchange system
brought employment and stability. But in the decades to follow, direct support for the exchange
system disappeared. At the same time, grants for the working poor and the unemployed became
more conditional. Time limits or work requirements now limit government grants to those who
are actively seeking a place in the exchange system, or already have one. But this leaves many
people struggling. We observe that families step in to fill the gap to the best of their ability,
which makes the transition into the exchange system more comfortable for those of wealthier
families, but fails to translate into better earnings by the time the young adults reach their thirties.
Private grants represent another form of “back up” but an investigation into their most common
sources and destinations reveals that the share going toward meeting the needs of the neediest is
negligent. If we are to address the biggest flaws in the exchange system, we can rely neither on
parents to pick up the tab, nor can we create a system in which the richest few are expected to
support the bottom through charity. The government needs to live up to its potential and either
provide grants through a basic income guarantee (BIG) or expand the exchange system through a
job guarantee (JG). This chapter reviews both policies’ structure, past experience, and economic
viability.
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Securing Grants: The Basic Income Guarantee (BIG)
A BIG would provide a base level government grant to all US citizens. The most robust
proposals call for a grant that is large enough to cover basic living expenses in the current
economic climate, and demand that grant be extended to everyone, unconditionally, so that
selling one’s labor on in the exchange system would be a matter of choice, not need. Other
proposals outline a negative income tax in which those at the bottom of the distribution receive a
larger grant than those at the top, or a partial income guarantee, which supplements earned
income but does not aim to be capable of replacing it. Here, I will concern myself with the fullfledged version of the model, in which everyone, regardless of race, schooling, or labor market
status receives the same subsistence-level government grant.
Proponents of such a BIG policy argue that it is every citizen’s right to live with a basic
level of dignity, irrespective of his or her ability or desire to partake in the exchange economy
(Lewis, Pressman, and Wilderquist 2005). Vocal advocates like Guy Standing (2010) argue that
this would “de-commodify labor,” and help us prepare for a future in which automated processes
make human jobs become increasingly obsolete. The introduction of a BIG would allow citizens
to pursue activities in their own interest, be it leisure, self-employment, or a continued
participation in the exchange system. There would be no disincentive to work, because benefits
would not disappear with the arrival of exchange based income. The stigma currently attached to
welfare payments would disappear, because everyone, even the wealthy, would receive the BIG.
Operationally, the BIG is very simple. All it takes is for the government to mail monthly
checks to its citizens; no vetting, means testing, or application procedures required. The BIG
could encompass all other government grants, making highly bureaucratic systems like
unemployment insurance, TANF, and SNAP obsolete. Everything could be combined in one, and
be send to citizens the same way social security checks are sent.
The BIG, however, is not cheap. Most BIG advocates call for that money to be raised in
income and profit taxes. They suggest the wealthy would make higher tax payments than the
poor, and the government would distribute the proceeds equally. This would be a vast
redistribution of income, and certainly help reduce the disparities that currently characterize the
US economy. But it would also create perverse incentives, which call the viability of a BIG into
question. If wages and profits are taxed more heavily in the presence of a BIG, production may
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slow down. That may be desirable from an environmental point of view. But it is detrimental if
the tax payments generated by that same production provide the financing for the BIG. Because
then the BIG “dis-incentivizes the very production process that generates the income that
supports [it]” (Tcherneva 2013, 70).
As discussed before, the Federal government is the sole issuer of its own currency, and
can thus spend as needed. But if it does so without expanding production it may not increase real
consumption for recipients of the income grant; therefore, a BIG could be self-defeating
(Tcherneva 2005). Flassbeck (2017, 81—83) agrees that the BIG is unlikely to be
economically—or politically—viable, because it would increase earnings without increasing
production by the same amount. Doing so without generating wage and cost pressure on prices,
he thinks, is “hardly imaginable.” He further adds that proponents of the BIG underestimate the
imbalance of power that characterizes our modern economies. “Ultimately, the rich will find a
way to profit from a basic income to the detriment of the poor” he predicts. Flassbeck is not the
only one to raise this latter concern. Stephanie Kelton has spoken out about this consequence,
too. Once given a basic income, she warns, the poor will have lost the little bargaining power
they have. When their BIG money loses value and will fail to provide them with quality health
care, child care, and a safe living environment, there will be plenty to complain about. But now
that they have been given money for free, nobody will listen. Further, the BIG will increase
inequality, as the wealthy will be able to invest their monthly check, while the poor have to
consume it (Kelton 2016).
Several nations, however, have already experimented with trials, or even more permanent
implementations of the BIG. In Brazil, the beginnings of a BIG erupted in 1995, with the
introduction of the Bolsa Escola Program in Campinas, which extended half a minimum wage to
those low-income families that successfully kept their children in school. Other districts soon
followed, providing a full minimum wage irrespective of family size. Six years later, the
Brazilian federal government introduced the citizens card, which would combine Bolsa Escola
along with other direct transfer programs into one (Suplicy 2003). This collective transfer
became Bolsa Familia in 2003, and expanded from 3.5 million families in 2003 to 11.2 million
families in 2006, which is almost all families that live on less that R$120 per month. Under
President Lula, the program was then approved to extend to all Brazilian residents, and be
provided unconditionally (Suplicy 2007).
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Alaska serves as another much-cited example for the BIG. The state created a so-called
permanent fund in the 1970s, to smoothen their income from natural resources. The dangers of
rising and falling oil prices lead to a rainy day fund, and once dividends started being paid to
citizens in 1982, a basic income was born. Tied to the price of oil, however, the Permanent Fund
Dividend fluctuates in size. In 2011, the funds total value was $37.5 billion, and that year’s
dividend was $1,174 for the year, which is far below subsistence (Brown and Thomas 1994).
Now, Europe is experimenting with a BIG. Finland is currently running a trial in which
2000 randomly selected individuals receive €560 per month, while another 175,000 individuals
serve as a control group (Kangas, Simanainen, and Honkanen 2017). The trial follows decades of
proposals towards a Finnish BIG, each of which vary in their specific approach, and failed to
gain political credibility until recently (Koistinen and Perkio 2014). The Netherlands announced
the coming of a similar experiment in Utrecht, but continues to fight for approval from
Parliament. Switzerland already went so far as to launch a popular initiative referendum for or
against a BIG, but only managed convinced 23.1 percent of Swiss citizens to vote “yes.” The
majority of those voting against cited concerns about the programs financing, which was largely
left out of the discussion (Santens 2016).
As such, the BIG aims to provide a government grant that allows all citizens decent living
conditions irrespective of their ability or willingness to sell their labor in the exchange economy.
Trials have been run, but none have been of the size and scope of the policy proposed, and thus
fail to give a realistic estimate of the program’s effectiveness. Nikiforos, Steinbaum, and Zezza
(2017), however, attempt to fill this gap by simulating the costs and impacts of three different
BIG models. The first model is a “child allowance” of $250 per month per child below the age of
16; the second model is a basic income of $500 per month for all adults; and the third is a basic
income of $1,000 per month for all adults. The first, second, and third model yield annual cost
estimates of $208 billion, $249 billion, and $2,990 billion, respectively. The authors consider
two different financing options. First, a fiscally neutral option in which the BIG is funded with
tax payments, and second, a deficit-financed option, in which the increase in government
transfers is matched by an equal increase in the government deficit. After running the
simulations, the authors find the following macro-economic effects:
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Table 5: Simulated Macroeconomic Impact of Six BIG Programs (Accounting for
Distributional Effects)
Deficit-Financed

Fiscally Neutral

$250
child

$500
adult

$1000
adult

$250
child

$500
adult

$1000
adult

Real GDP*

0.84%

6.79%

13.10%

0.27%

1.65%

2.62%

Price Level*
Nominal Wages*

0.26%
0.35%

2.02%
2.80%

3.77%
5.23%

0.06%
0.06%

0.37%
0.37%

0.56%
0.51%

Government Deficit

0.52%

4.61%

9.11%

-0.08%

-0.78%

-1.39%

Employment Rate
Labor Force

0.12%
348

1.12%
2,502

2.11%
4,703

0.04%
104

0.21%
690

0.31%
1,110

*percentage difference from baseline scenario
Source: Nikiforos, Steinbaum, and Zezza (2017)

These findings reveal a much greater macroeconomic impact for the deficit-financed
programs than the fiscally neutral programs. The most sizable BIG, at $1000 per adult per
month, could bring about a 13.1 percent increase in GDP from the baseline, a 5.23 percent
increase in nominal wages, and a 2.11 percent increase in the employment rate. However, it
would be accompanied by an increase in prices of 3.77 percent. This is consistent with
Tcherneva (2005), who warns for the effects that a BIG may have on inflation. Inflation may
lower in subsequent years, however, until the economy reaches full employment. Further, when
financed in a fiscally neutral manner, the authors show inflation to be much smaller: just 0.56
percent for the biggest of the three programs under consideration. As such, this financing
structure could circumvent the potential price increase. But doing so would remove much of the
impact that a BIG could have. This financing option yields a meager 2.62 percent percentage
difference from the baseline, which is very modest compared to the 13.10 percent that results
from a deficit-financed program of the same size.
Either way, the BIG programs considered by Nikiforos, Steinbaum, and Zezza (2017) are
still relatively small in scope. Even the biggest one, extending $1000 per month to each adult,
would likely be insufficient for subsistence. As such, it should be noted that the cost of an
appropriately sized BIG would be considerably higher than the estimates reported here. Charles
Clark (2003) considers the potential cost of a larger BIG program based on the year 2002, in
which children under 18 receive $3,500 per year, working age adults receive $9,369 per year,
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and the elderly receive top-up payments such that they are lifted above the poverty line. Based
on a children’s population of 72.89 million, an adult population of 129.87 million, and $34,184
required in top-up payments, the annual cost of this BIG program comes to $1.9 trillion. That
would have been 14.66 percent of GDP in 2002. If financed through a flat tax, the required rate
would be 32.2 percent, with no income tax deductions (Clark 2003). Such high taxes could be
avoided if the program were deficit financed, of course. Clark (2003) does not discuss this
option. Given the findings from Nikiforos, Steinbaum, and Zezza (2017), however, this option
would yield a bigger impact on GDP, employment rates, and wages. But it could also yield a
higher price increase upon implementation.

Expanding Exchange: The job guarantee (JG)
Another way to address the gaps in the exchange system is to tackle them directly. In the case of
unemployment and inequality, direct job creation could go a long way towards solving both.
Proponents of the JG call for the federal government to serve as an employer of last resort by
offering employment to anyone able and willing to work, without requiring additional education
beyond on-the-job training. Jobs would be provided at a living wage, and include substantial
benefit packages, to set a standard for the rest of the exchange system. This would remove the
threat of unemployment, and give workers a better bargaining position, because companies
would have to provide conditions at least as good as those of the government-guaranteed jobs.
Beyond improving workers bargaining power, government-guaranteed jobs can help generate the
real resources that communities need. While funding and general guidelines would come from
the federal level, municipalities and communities at the local level would be given the agency to
identify the needs in their community, and to solve them through collaborative efforts.
Just like the BIG proposals, JG proposals vary in their specific recommendations. Wray,
Tcherneva, Forstater, and Kelton have argued for local non-profit organizations to serve a key
role in the provision of such jobs, and suggest the jobs all be paid the same living wage. Harvey
(1989) has suggested a pay scale that rewards based on skill levels. Aja et al. (2013) exclude
non-profits from their proposal, but do support a federal funding structure, as opposed to a local
one. Proponents, however, tend to agree that the strength in the JG lies in its ability to include
everyone into the exchange economy, regardless of their skill level, and that the program creates
not just stable incomes for those in need, but also real resources that contribute to the public
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good. JG jobs can provide much needed services such as child care, elderly care, environmental
preservation, infrastructure maintenance, local farms production, community centers, etc. Many
of the goods and services that the exchange system otherwise lacks could be provided this way.
Participation in their provision can give the otherwise unemployed a purpose and a community,
and prevent them from being unemployable because of lost skills during lengthy periods outside
the labor force. Government grants for those unable to work would be preserved.
The economic viability of the JG has been much discussed. Proponents point to three
beneficial impacts of the JG on the macro economy. First, the JG would expand and contract in
response to changes in the private economy; it would operate counter-cyclically. If the private
economy under performs, more workers will take up JG jobs. This way, workers would maintain
their purchasing power, which would contain the downturn. Vice versa, a high performing
private sector may result in a contraction of JG jobs, allowing for a counter-cyclical stabilizing
mechanism. Second, implementation of a JG in the US—financed by the federal governments’
sovereign currency spending—will have a negligent impact on inflation. Intuitively, this makes
sense. The JG increases earnings and production at the same time. But another way the JG
ensures price stability is by anchoring the value of the currency to the labor hour. If the Federal
government sets the JG wage to $15 per hour, $15 dollars in now worth one labor hour. This
mechanism anchors the value of the currency, helping to maintain price stability in the whole
economy.
In the US, there is living proof that a JG can be highly effective. The New Deal, as
discussed more extensively in Chapter III included the WPA, the NYA, and the CCC, which
provided direct, federally funded employment without additional education, creating as much as
13 million jobs (Taylor 2009). Still maintaining some eligibility criteria, the program was not as
inclusive as a JG program ought to be. But when it comes to the operational structure, the New
Deal presents evidence that mobilizing the resources and generating positive projects at a
nationwide scale is entirely possible.
More evidence for the effectiveness of the JG comes from Argentina, where Plan Jefes y
Jefas de Hogar was introduced in 2002. The program was implemented right after the Argentine
economy had plunged into recession and unemployment rates had reached as high as 21.5
percent. In exchange for four hours of work per day, the program offered 150 pesos per month to
the heads of households with a child, a pregnant woman, or a disabled person. Labor market
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status, level of education, and gender did not matter. As such, the eligibility conditions were
broad enough to incorporate nearly two million participants at the programs peak, at a cost of 1
percent of GDP. Project guidelines were provided at the federal level, but specific approaches
were left to the local communities that would be their beneficiaries. Projects that were initiated
include daycare centers, homeless shelters, food kitchens, subsistence farms, and recycling
efforts. Once the economy recovered, however, the program shrunk again as participants moved
back to the private sector. Unfortunately, Argentine policymakers took this as a sign to reform
the program, rather than keep it in in place to ensure the long-term stability and infinitely elastic
labor demand that the JG can provide (Tcherneva 2012).
Other evidence for the potential success of a JG comes from Fullwiler, Dantas, and
Tcherneva (2017), who simulate the economic impact and implementation costs of a JG with a
$15 hourly wage, available to full-time workers at 40 hours per week on average, and part-time
workers at 20 hours a week on average. Materials and other purchases are assumed to present an
extra 20 percent in cost. Jobs proposed also include health insurance, paid-time off, and
childcare, which adds another 20 percent beyond labor costs. This way, however, the JG is large
enough for part of the incomes to be taxed. The authors propose that 33 percent of the JG income
will be subject to federal income tax. Based on findings by Dantas and Wray (2017), the authors
simulate the impacts of such a program if 20 million people would like to participate either full
time or part time, using a higher and a lower bound estimate. If initiated in 2017, the proposed
program would be at full strength by the second quarter of 2018, and estimated to add between
$650 and $550 billion to real GDP in 2019 (Figure 7).
The authors also estimate the JG program’s impact in inflation over the time period. They
find that in 2019, inflation would be at its peak, reaching 0.80 percentage points above the
baseline for the lower bound. Thereafter, the authors show, inflation would fall again, dropping
to 0.17 percent (for the higher bound) or 0.18 percent (for the lower bound) by the end of 2022.
Overall, the authors conclude that the brought about by the JG would be “macroeconomically
insignificant.” Figure 8 represents these findings visually.
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Figure 7: Additional Real GDP from the JG (2017Q1 = Base, $ Billions)

Source: Fullwiler, Dantas, and Tcherneva (2017)

Figure 8: Inflationary Impact of the JG (Percentage Point Difference from Base
Value)

Source: Fullwiler, Dantas, and Tcherneva (2017)
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Figure 9: Direct Spending, Net Budgetary Impact, and Net Budgetary
Impact Less Interest for JG as a Percent of GDP (Annual Averages for
2019—2022)

Source: Fullwiler, Dantas, and Tcherneva (2017)

The direct cost of running the JG program at full strength for the years 2019—2022, the authors
find, is an average of $649 billion per year at the higher bound, and $528 billion at the lower
bound. As the higher bound estimate corresponds to three percent of GDP, this is much less than
Clark’s cost estimates for a 2002 BIG which landed at over 14 percent of GDP. The net
budgetary impact of this higher bound estimate would be between 2 and 2.2 percent of GDP,
depending on the interest on national debt. Figure 9 illustrates these results. The authors
conclude that a generous JG program like the one described could add fourteen to nineteen
million jobs to the labor force, at a cost no higher than three percent of GDP, and with
macroeconomically insignificant levels of inflation.

Grants-Based versus Exchange-Based Policy Making
Minsky, too, advocates for a JG program, encouraging the government to step in as the
“employer of last resort,” thus providing a buffer in an otherwise inherently unstable system. He
advocates for this approach over the expansion of grants (welfare) which he deemed to be a
conservative solution to poverty. Welfare, he explains, implies that the problem lies with the
individual. It suggests there is something wrong with the individual that makes them a poor fit
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within the exchange world. Unless they are truly disabled, or old, giving them welfare (a grant)
suggests that they are the problem. But really, the system is the problem. “Our economy,”
Minsky (1987, 1) wrote, “as it is now organized is not capable of achieving and sustaining full
employment” [original emphasis]. Providing people with grants is like giving up on them, and
refusing to alter the exchange system in such a way that it can it incorporate all, not just most
people willing and able to work. People are not failing, capitalism is. And a grant will not change
capitalism; it will simply cover up the issue. Grants are appropriate for those who are unable to
work; children, disabled, diseased, and elderly people. They are not appropriate for those who
are willing and able.
Sen’s (1999, 61) work, too, helps to compare grants and exchange based solutions. In
Development as Freedom, he discusses the benefits to employment beyond that of monetary
income: “unemployment is not merely a deficiency of income that can be made up through
transfers by the state,” he explains. It also a source of “debilitating effects on individual freedom,
initiative, and skills.” Further, he stresses that it contributes to social exclusion, loss of selfreliance, self-confidence and both psychological and physical health. Sen’s point is reinforced by
Jefes y Jefas participant feedback on the program. When interviewed about their participation in
the program, most (42 percent) respondents gave “I could do something” as the primary reason
for satisfaction, followed by “It provides a good environment” (26 percent), and “I help the
community” (12 percent). Only 6 percent gave “I have an income” as the main reason for
satisfaction with the policy. This confirms why an income and a job can be a lot better than just
an income. Further evidence arises from the subsequent transformation of Jefes y Jefas into Plan
Familias, which reverted the program back to a grant-based structure with the intention to nudge
women back into the home, where they would be able to look after the household. Tcherneva
finds that women were reluctant to make the switch, even when Plan Familias offered a higher
grant than Jefes y Jefas offered wages; fewer than 50 percent of targeted women made the
switch. The Argentine government failed to recognize that paid labor gave women personal
dignity and valuable bargaining power in the home (Tcherneva 2013).
So even though BIG could help provide grants at a bigger scale and relieve some of the
gaps in exchange, the JG has many benefits on top of that. Aside from being cheaper, the JG
does three things that a BIG cannot do. First, it gives the poor the chance to participate and
contribute to the wellbeing of society. Second, it serves as a stabilizing force in the economy by
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expanding and contracting counter-cyclically. Third, it would yield the production of real
resources that serve the public good, ranging from childcare to public parks to urban farming,
recycling, and more. As such, a grant expansion like a BIG may offer relief to those currently
underserved by exchange. But a more effective and sustainable way to address perpetual
unemployment and inequality would to transform the exchange system with a JG, thus allowing
everyone willing and able to partake.
VII. CONCLUSION
This thesis asks what Boulding’s grants economics can teach us about how to tackle inequality
and unemployment in the modern US economy. I reviewed Boulding’s framework of Grants
Economics, which serves to expand our understanding of the economy to include one-way
exchanges (grants). Those one-way exchanges can be performed by the government (social
welfare), by the family (parents supporting their children) and in the private sphere (charity and
philanthropy). I explored each of these sources of grants in the context of the modern US
economy and questioned their ability to complement the exchange system, particularly in the
areas of unemployment and inequality.
First, I discussed the public sector. The public sector can focus its efforts where it wants.
Both engagement in the exchange sector and the provision of grants are possible. Over the course
of the twentieth century, we have seen both. With the introduction of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the
federal government first began providing grants. The Social Security Act was enacted to support
those underserved by the exchange economy, and continues to operate (albeit under some threat)
today. But at the same time, Roosevelt’s administration tackled some of the problems in
exchange directly. The WPA employed workers directly, providing jobs to all men able and
willing to work. In later years, the approach changed. Although government grants were further
expanded in the 1960s with Medicare and Medicaid, the efforts for direct employment were
largely abandoned. Johnson’s War on Poverty provided job training, but no jobs. Later, Reagan,
Clinton, and Bush ensured that the grants took a hit as well. In the attempt to enhance the
incentive to work, grants became smaller and time limited. Having withdrawn itself from direct
job creation in the exchange system, and reduced the availability of grants in the grants
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economy, the federal government’s ability to complement an inherently inadequate exchange
system has crumbled.
Without adequate government aid in either the exchange or the grants economy, a greater
burden falls on families. In the fourth chapter of this paper, I reviewed the trends in parental
assistance to young adults. Faced with declining demand for low skilled labor, many young
adults postpone their transition from the grants economy into the exchange economy. Parents
continue to support their offspring for longer, either through in-kind transfers like co-residence,
or monetary assistance to cover education and living expenses. Parents of higher socioeconomic
status provide more assistance to their off spring more often, suggesting that the reliance on
family grant to bridge these gaps in the exchange system could have an inequality-exacerbating
effect. Work by Swartz, McLaughlin, and Mortimer (2017) suggests that parental assistance (inkind or monetary) during a young adult’s twenties does not have a significant impact on his or
her earning by the time he or she is 31. This would imply that 1) parental assistance may not be
as inequality increasing as expected and 2) family grants can do little to improve earnings if there
are no jobs available. Without further study, however, we cannot rule out the inequality
increasing effects of family grants later in life, as well as on wealth. Furthermore, a larger study,
or a wider geographical reach may yield different results.
Another source of grants that serves to complement a flawed exchange system is the
private sphere. Charity and philanthropy are vast in the US, having represented around 2 percent
of GDP throughout the twentieth century. Individual giving especially, has taken on large
magnitudes, which begs the question if it can be equally large in its capacity to solve the
problems that our flawed exchange economy produces. Unfortunately, the answer is that it
cannot. Work by Reich (2013) shows that only a small fraction of charity and philanthropic
grants go towards meeting basic needs of others. The majority helps to sustain churches, and
provides ever more funding for the nations’ wealthiest institutions of higher education.
Motivated by the grantor’s sympathy for the grantee, private grants can hardly be expected to
serve those in greatest need, for those most capable of giving may also be those least capable of
sympathizing. Tax structures suggest a substitutability between government grants and private
grants, but a closer look shows they are complements at best.
As such, grants from families and private entities are unable to fill the gaps in exchange;
the federal government is the only body that can and should be expected to meet this need. The
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federal government can take two approaches to this end. One is to secure the necessary grants for
all citizens to enjoy a basic living standard through a BIG. Another is to transform the exchange
exchange system through a JG, such that everyone that is willing and able can work. The BIG
aims to make participation in the exchange economy (in the form of selling one’s labor) optional,
rather than necessary to survive. Supplied with an unconditional grant, every US citizen would
be able to enjoy a basic standard of living. This would allow more people to enjoy leisure, care
for their children, or pursue the otherwise overly risky path of self-employment. The JG aims to
transform the exchange system so that it can incorporate everyone at their current level of
education. Guaranteeing employment at living wages with benefits to anyone able and willing to
work, unemployment would be eradicated. This would set a standard for the private sector to
emulate, raise working conditions throughout the exchange system, and provide a stabilizing
force in an otherwise unstable system. While the need for grants would persist for those unable
to work due to old age or disability, grants like unemployment insurance, and food stamps would
become redundant.
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